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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

'Underground' Military Activists Interviewed

MK1103100893 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 11, 14 Mar 93 (Signed to Press
9 Mar 93) pp C8-9

[Interview with unnamed army officers, heads of "underground strike committees," by Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Zhilin: "Underground Committee Functioning?.."]

[Text] When we at the ARMIYA ROSSII editorial office received the first report that underground strike committees were being set up in Russian army line units, I was skeptical. But soon we received from our correspondents some excerpts from the organizations' program of activities and confirmation of their existence. It was then that I tried to reach the "fighters from the invisible front." All my efforts were initially in vain.

Then recently, outside the "Park Kultury" subway station I was approached by a young man, who said: "We are prepared to meet with you. I must warn you that the meeting will be confidential. If you agree, then come right away."

I went into the subway with Sergey, as my companion called himself, and we spent an hour traveling, changing trains and stations in the meantime. I do not know what his purpose was; perhaps he was afraid of being followed, or maybe he was simply trying to impress me. This aimless journey in rush hour in overcrowded cars, in which with the best will in the world it would have been impossible to spot a detective anyway, reminded me of a scene from a cheap crime novel. Finally, we wound up back at "Park Kultury" station and set off for the appointed place.

There seven people were already waiting for us. Officers—three lieutenant colonels and four majors (all in uniform), representing the Navy, Air Force, Missile, Airborne Assault, Ground Forces, and Communications troops. The geographical representation was as follows: Far East, Transbaykal, Urals, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kaliningrad. They were aged between 28 and 38. Their official positions ranged from battalion commander to regimental deputy commander. All seven described themselves as chairmen of underground strike committees. They had come to the capital, they said, to attend a conference of the "central coordinating council" and to receive instructions on changing their tactics in connection with the change in the moral and psychological climate in troop units. Here are some extracts from our conversation.

[Zhilin] How did your committees come about?

[Officers] The idea of setting up unofficial structures came from the western region. To be precise, it came from military units stationed in the Baltic area. It all began with rudimentary efforts by officers to protect

their own social and civil rights. At first we acted quite legally and openly. At one point we even thought that the Defense Ministry heads would listen to us and heed the views of the army grassroots. For instance, we declared that personnel must not be withdrawn from the Baltic area to Russia and sent to unprepared locations. Whereupon General Grachev gave an interview in which he gave assurances that no soldier would be redeployed until the social base had been prepared. But the troop withdrawal soon began. We were about to blurt out: How can this be?... Immediately we got the treatment from the army administration: Several of our guys were discharged. There have been many examples of this kind. We realize that there is no point cooperating with these authorities.

[Zhilin] What are the tasks and aims of the structures you head?

[Officers] We now see that in this outrageous situation, where no one is bothered about the military's future, we have to act on our own. But to do that we have to prepare a social, moral, psychological, and political base. Our tasks for today are as follows. To demonstrate to the personnel the total inability of the leadership of the Defense Ministry and of the country as a whole to manage the processes taking place in the army and the state. To make public cases where servicemen's rights have been flouted and to expose the thieving army elite.

Indeed, we are generating overt contempt for the current rulers. This will be the key feeling when the time comes for the violent armed overthrow of the existing authorities...

[Zhilin] But where does the struggle for social guarantees for the military come into it? Let us be frank: We are talking about a coup d'etat...

[Officers] Think what you like. Our view is that we are acting to save Russia, for the good of the people...

[Zhilin] They always say that, those who perform the role of a military junta.

[Officers] All dictatorships are similar in one way or another. Maybe we are criminals as far as the authorities are concerned, but not as far as the people and the Fatherland are concerned. Then again, what difference is there, for example, between us and, say, the National Salvation Front, the Officers Union, or the communist opposition? Perhaps just the fact that we are stating our intentions honestly: Since you cannot change the authorities by legal means, you have to do it with the aid of an assault rifle. The others engage in hypocritical verbal wrangling, although the same methods of attaining their goals are implicit. So which of us is the honest one?

[Zhilin] What political forces are closest to you; with whom do you have the closest links?

[Officers] We do not rule out close contacts with the communists, with the National Salvation Front, and with other political forces at the stage of assuming

power. But then, we will see who's who, so to speak. We have representatives in practically all the major parties. As informers, for now. To get a clear picture of the political situation we need to know what people are interested in.

[Zhilin] Are you prepared to sacrifice human lives to achieve your goals? After all, what you are proposing is civil war.

[Officers] There could indeed be a great deal of bloodshed, because we intend to act decisively. But ever since the old days Russia has cured its political and economic ills through bloodletting. No other method of treatment can help our state...

[Zhilin] Are you not frightened that the people might not support you, just as they did not support the SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency]?

[Officers] The people could not, did not want to support this drunken, debauched political rabble, who had discredited themselves. Our leaders are different. Waking up one morning the people see a military man on the television screen. Going out into the street and seeing the looters, the racketeers, the pseudo-entrepreneurs and the rest of the riffraff leaning against lampposts chatting, they realize that the brothels are closed and that it is time to go to work. I can assure you, no one will be dashing onto the square to organize some crazy rally. We call it the "Dudayev effect." How did he win the people over? With talk about law and order and with a magnificent summer dress uniform... At first we need a leader without intellectual hangups. Then he will need to be replaced by someone like, for example, Alksnis, who would then do some constructive work. But this is all theoretical. Tumultuous events usually throw up worthy people.

[Zhilin] What kind of regime do you have in mind for Russia?

[Officers] A tough military dictatorship. Chilean-style, for example. Capable of reviving the economy and industry and halting inflation. There is no need to think up anything new, it has all been thought up and approved before; we need to take a finished model...

[Zhilin] From what you say, you are prepared to take decisive action.

[Officers] That is what we are preparing for. For example, we have good links with the center. We regularly send and receive from there information, instructions, and directions. Our biggest problem, though, is that of preventing a split of opinion in the army. There is a danger of that. Some people are more inclined toward the democrats (although there are fewer and fewer of them in the army), some prefer the communists, some people's sympathies lie with the National Salvation Front or "Civic Union"... We are trying to dispel these sympathies. A military man must love strong authority, which is what he personifies. Few people know we are

members of underground committees. A committee's controlling nucleus is no bigger than six people. But the vast majority of officers sympathize with our ideas, which we are secretly spreading. Actually, it all depends on the activity of our local leaders. In places where they act purposefully and react swiftly to situations, about 80 percent of the personnel are under our indirect control. Frankly, our job is made easier by the fact that there are practically no people of recognized authority, no obvious leaders left in the army.

[Zhilin] Do you intend to act within the confines of Russia or is it your aim to recreate the USSR?

[Officers] Unfortunately, it is no longer possible to restore the empire. It is an illusion entertained by the guys from the Officers Union. But to put together a Slavic bloc: Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus—that is a perfectly realistic proposition. As soon as we raise the flag of decisive action, officers in Crimea will rise up first. We are sure of that. Belarus cannot really be taken seriously, because it does not have an army as such and all the military units are Russian ones. Ukraine is somewhat more complicated: Defense Minister Morozov wields considerable and increasing authority in the forces, which is a nuisance for us.

[Zhilin] You mean that similar committees have been set up in these republics' armed forces too?

[Officers] No, we only have committees in the Russian army, which is in the most perilous state. We have personal links with colleagues in the CIS. [officers end]

...On returning from the meeting I wondered how serious it all was—what the "illegals" had been saying. Is it shock tactics? Are they trying to pass their little groups off as serious organizations? Or is it a real threat? It is possible that by no means everything these "defenders of the Fatherland" say is true. But the evidence we are receiving from the forces partly confirms the danger. Moreover, we know that similar Officers Union and National Salvation Front underground organizations are being set up at the army grassroots level. Whether they pose a major danger today is an open question. But there is no doubt that they do exist.

The postscript to this is that at a recent press conference of the Russian Democratic Reforms Movement on army problems I said that I was preparing this piece for MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI.

On 25 February I was summoned to the military prosecutor's office.

They spent some hours pressing me to name the "illegals" (only a naive person would think that they had given me their names). If not I would have to forget about publishing the article. I can understand the prosecutor's office's desire to get the information. But obviously these questions should be put not to me, but to the services that are responsible for the situation in the army, for example, members of counterintelligence. The

prosecutor's office's demand that I should not publish appears very strange indeed.

New Publication To Cover Regional Conflicts

934F0364C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Apr 93 p 3

[Article: "The First Issue of the Newspaper VOYNA I MIR [War and Peace] Will Soon Be Published in Moscow"]

[Text] The newspaper intends to publicize objectively the events taking place in regions of military conflicts and interethnic confrontations on Russian territory. A special service has been created within the editorial board for covering the search for hostages and missing prisoners of war.

CIS: POLICY

Shaposhnikov on Military Role in Politics

934K0738A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 11, 17 Mar 93 p 11

[Interview with Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, by various media representatives, place and date not given: "The Army Does Not Intend To Play Politics"]

[Text]

[A. UDALTSOV, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editor in chief] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, let me ask you perhaps an epic question: What has happened overall with our Army? I listened to your explanations on "Red Quadrant," but I am unable to precisely understand just what is under your command, whether or not you even have an automatic weapons company in Moscow with which to defend yourself if something happens (I am joking). Perhaps you command only missile silos in Ukraine and Belarus? That is the first thing. We have the Russian Army and Ukraine sort of has its own army. But things are more complicated in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. There are armed contingents, national guard... Into what component parts and in what manner did the USSR Army disintegrate, and are there military units which are subordinate to you in all republics of the former Union?

[Ye. SHAPOSHNIKOV] When the Soviet Union ceased to exist, there was no decision with respect to the Army. It was noted that everything would be under a single command, that a single military-strategic space would be maintained. We had a long conversation with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin following his arrival from Belovezhskaya Pushcha. At that time he was inclined to believe that the Armed Forces should remain unified. But the division was begun by legislative organs of certain states. Ukraine, for example, adopted a number of laws as early as 1991 on its own armed forces.

I had my own concept: As long as legislative acts were not drawn up, as long as there were no military structures in the CIS states which could fully and effectively direct the armed forces, we should leave everything as is. In other words—we would declare a transition period from unified armed forces to joint armed forces. Over this period we would resolve social issues of servicemen, and over this same time we could create the necessary structures for command and control and assist in getting them established.

On 21 December 1991 we touched upon this question in Alma-Ata, and the presidents decided not to change anything at that time. But when we met in Minsk on 30 December, all the presidents, with the exception of Yeltsin and Nazarbayev, started to talk about each state having the right to create its own armed forces. I even announced my intention to resign at that time in this connection.

But even after the declaration that each state may have its own armed forces and take practical steps to establish them, I did not imagine that these armies would be autonomous, that they would exist and operate independently of one another. Consider any sphere of the military—air defense and antimissile systems, all the infrastructure, the information space, target detection—to this day I cannot imagine how these can exist separately if the Air Defense Army in Central Asia is situated in the territory of three states.

Then the Treaty on Collective Security was concluded and signed by six states: Russia, Kazakhstan, and the states of Central Asia with the exception of Turkmenia and Armenia. Nonetheless, processes for further rapprochement did not move forward. At this session we looked at two variants of operation of the Main Command, one of which was to be approved by the heads of state at a meeting 30 April in Yerevan. The first version was similar to the Warsaw Pact, the second—to the NATO system. I insisted on the condition that in any event, the armed forces of these six states would be truly combined, and would remain international in composition and spirit. Today in operational subordination to the Main Command of the Joint Armed Forces, we have strategic forces situated in the territory of four states, and of general-designation forces—only a small number of troops, assigned by order of the ministers of defense of the Commonwealth states to carry out peacemaking operations. I therefore made the decision to conduct a conference on 27 March of this year of the defense ministers of only those states of the Commonwealth which had signed the Treaty on Collective Security. But things cannot continue like this. A massive number of issues arise—from social and material-technical questions to strategic ones. These issues cannot be resolved in isolation—even such a powerful state as Russia cannot do it.

My concept calls for a definite political structure to be over the Joint Armed Forces. Therefore we propose that the Collective Security Council be comprised of the

presidents and premiers of the six states, and that its working organs be councils of the ministers of defense and ministers of foreign affairs. A joint secretariat could accomplish the organization of all activity of the Collective Security Council.

[Yu. KULIKOV, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA deputy editor in chief] Do you not have the feeling that the Russian Army has recently been moving away from the president, that it has stopped supporting him, and in this regard, is not a portion of it shifting to support the right-wingers who yearn for power? If you just recall the officers' assembly...

[Ye. SHAPOSHNIKOV] The question "Whose side is the Army on?" is from the arena of—let us separate into red and white, into blue and green. I am against such a division. In order to expound on this concept we probably have to delve into history a bit. When unrestrained reductions in the Armed Forces began during the Khrushchev era, and then troops were used in Novocherkassk, questions of defense arose for the first time in fairly critical fashion. Then came Brezhnev. I will state quite frankly that he related quite well to the Army. Probably because he himself served for a certain period. But there was Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. And the problems therefore grew. During perestroika, political structures, the political authority, did not even attempt to defend the Army under conditions of mounting criticism. What should our political leadership have done in connection with the events in Baku, Tbilisi, and Vilnius? Take responsibility. But instead: I just woke up and know nothing about what is going on there. And the Army felt it was being sent into fire, even while hearing hypocritical statements to the effect that the Army had long since not had any internal mission.

When August 1991 came, there were figures who attempted to use the Army to intimidate people. But it would not happen with our thinking Army. Then more time passed and some of this criticism died down. The Union collapsed and forces turned up which began to nudge the Army: Let us preserve the USSR with bayonets. And these people with initiative did not have the sense to think that we would be facing not a Yugoslavia, but something significantly greater in terms of destruction and victims. Even the United Nations would be unable to extinguish such a conflagration, were it to begin. The Army therefore has no greater authority than the law. After prolonged torment it has come to understand this, and I hope it always will.

[S. OGANYAN, deputy executive secretary of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] But does the very formulation of the question seem constitutional to you? Whom should the Army serve?

[Ye. SHAPOSHNIKOV] The Army must serve the law. Were it stipulated by law to send me out—out I go, where I am needed. But there is no such law. And the Army has no intention of playing politics—thus, it is not necessary to formulate the question.

[Yu. SHCHEKOKHIKHIN, member of the editorial board of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] On the officers' assembly. How strong are Achalov and Makashov? Can the Army be used today to attempt a military coup?

[Ye. SHAPOSHNIKOV] I have already cited the example of August for you. The Army woke up. Though the officers' assembly which conferred upon itself the title of All-Army tried to say: We can do anything. But to some degree this is probably indulgence in wishful thinking.

[A. SABOV, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA columnist] You started out as USSR minister of defense. Then made a smooth transition to the post of commander in chief of the Armies of the Commonwealth. You promised to wear civilian clothes, and you have donned them several times. But now as commander in chief of the Armies of the Commonwealth, you are not wearing civilian clothes any more. Is this just by accident?

Do you not feel awkward that, strange as it may seem, you are a representative of Russia? Is it possible in the future that the commander in chief of Commonwealth forces will be from some other country, and might this be somewhat uncomfortable for Russia?

[Ye. SHAPOSHNIKOV] With respect to my clothes, everyone has his own taste. When we have a conference of defense ministers I wear the uniform. Sometimes I come to work in civilian clothes. I am still recognized. It is not important what color a cat is—just so long as it catches mice.

Now—on the citizenship of the commander in chief. Problems exist. But they are invented, those related to the fact that I am a citizen of Russia. I fight for some amorphous CIS, for some Joint Armed Forces. And by virtue of this, it is as if I do not stand up in defense of the interests of Russia, which would like to see itself first and foremost as the most important element in the Commonwealth. Yes, Russia is the chief element in the Commonwealth, but the people of Russia have no need to constantly stress this. And the fact that a citizen of Russia is the commander in chief, appointed by all the presidents of the CIS, emphasizes once again Russia's role in the Commonwealth. This is an objective fact.

[Yu. SHCHEKOKHIKHIN] To what extent today do you control the nuclear forces in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan? Can Ukraine Minister of Defense Morozov give the order to carry out a missile attack against Moscow?

[Ye. SHAPOSHNIKOV] If he goes crazy and issues such an order, he will be giving it on his own and will execute it with his pistol. But realistically, such a missile strike is impossible: In accordance with the Alma-Ata understandings, only two individuals today can put their finger on the nuclear trigger—Yeltsin and Shaposhnikov. But

all the other presidents have at their disposal instantaneous conference link through which they can quickly effect the necessary consultations.

When the CIS was being formed, there was no discussion as to how long nuclear forces would remain in the territories of the republics. They decided that all the CIS states would strive to attain nonnuclear status, to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The Lisbon Protocol emerged (in May of last year), signed by four states of the CIS and the United States. This clearly stated that all the states of the Commonwealth, with the exception of Russia, would rid themselves of nuclear weapons located in their territories. Belarus fulfilled its obligations very swiftly, transferring its weapons to Russia's jurisdiction. Kazakhstan adheres to approximately the same position. But with Ukraine we see something strange. On the one hand, Ukraine says: We are striving to achieve nonnuclear status. On the other, they maintain nuclear weapons. I propose: Call yourself a nuclear power. No, they respond, we are not nuclear. Say that you are temporarily a nuclear power. No, we cannot. Say that you are a state in which nuclear weapons are situated temporarily. We could, but we do not want to.

This is the kind of devilishness we see, like a tug-of-war.

I think all of this is related to the fact that there are certain forces in the Ukrainian parliament which believe for some reason that the greatness and importance of the country depends on whether or not there will be Ukrainian nuclear weapons in Ukraine. While the fact of how much money has to be spent on them, the fact that it is necessary to fulfill previously undertaken obligations, and that by the year 2000 these weapons will have become not just dangerous but physically unsuitable because of their age—disturbs few.

[O. MOROZ, member of the editorial board of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] Recently there was a piece on television about the so-called privatization of dachas by a number of high-ranking military personnel. If I am not mistaken, your name was among them. The prices mentioned were very low—about 300,000 for the former state dacha of the Ministry of Defense. To what extent does this story conform to reality?

[Ye. SHAPOSHNIKOV] When Gorbachev was elected president at the Congress, he stated: I have never had a personal dacha. At that time I stopped and thought—why do you not have a personal dacha? Why a state dacha, why exploit all these servants and the like and take pride in it? In a normal state, if you have the money, you have a personal dacha.

I did not have anything. All of a sudden they appoint me minister of defense. No communications, no protection. What do I do? Spend nights in my office? It turns out—no, a dacha is afforded the minister of defense. When we went to see it, what a work of art! Five bedrooms, a dining room, sauna, swimming pool, movie theater, billiards table, garages, servants, etc. I asked: Whose dacha is this? It is for the minister of defense,

they say. Well, may I ask—where is Yazov's family? They live in another dacha—is the response.

Then I said: I will not set foot here again. It was as though they were letting me eat out of the feeding trough—while thinking and saying what the master wishes. I do not want to live this way. The next day I went to Gorbachev and Yeltsin: This is not right. They said: Let us think about what to do.

At that time there existed a so-called group of general inspectors—we have Army generals who did not retire on pension, but went over to this group. And they continued to occupy their official dachas just as they had before. I began to consult with them: "You are paying less than the required amount for rent under today's circumstances. I intend to move you out, lease the dachas out to joint enterprises, obtain hard currency and use it to meet social needs." A mass of protests greeted me in response. Are you saying you have to move out of the dacha when there is a change in power? Look, these people are advanced in years, and they are quite distinguished.

Once again I went to Gorbachev and Yeltsin: Let us privatize the dachas for the residents who are living in them. The Union leadership authorized this. And when the Union disintegrated, the Russian leadership got involved in the issue. We got the "okay" and I asked our administrators: Is there a dacha in the Ministry of Defense in which no one has ever lived? So that the impression is not created that I have taken it away from someone. They tell me there is such a dacha, not quite finished as yet. They show it to me. It is a five-room house. "What did this dacha cost the taxpayer?" They gave a figure of a hundred and some thousand. Then the coefficients were calculated and they arrived at 580,000, and later—1,300,000. I went to the bank and took out a loan to the year 2000. I paid for the dacha. Today this is how I live, and I do not feel that I have violated the law.

[A. TARASOV, editor of the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA science section] Grachev wanders all around the outlying regions and garrisons issuing orders: Protect weapons and property from robbery and plunder. Do you have certain empowerment and functions in this regard? And also—in the fight for the moral-political state of the Army?

[Ye. SHAPOSHNIKOV] When I was USSR minister of defense, I also issued such orders. Today our organization is not sitting on the sidelines. We have the Committee on the Rights of Servicemen which is involved in social issues. And if certain adversities crop up, we intervene. But these are interstate questions, as a rule. We assist in resolving them.

[V. BONCH-BRUYEVICH, member of the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editorial board] Soon after the August events there appeared reports that you were prepared, should the putsch develop, to bomb the Kremlin. And although such a prospect made one's flesh

crawl, it came across as valor, as the protection of democracy. As far as I know, you issued neither confirmation nor denial of this.

[Ye. SHAPOSHNIKOV] When 19 August arrived, I immediately realized that an illegal action had been undertaken. On 20 August I had to go to Yazov. I told him right to his face: "Let us put an end to this matter—it will lead to nothing good. If I were in your position, I would disperse the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency], arrest them, and bring Gorbachev here." I must note that Dmitriy Timofeyevich, in spite of the fact that he was a member of the GKChP, took in my words normally. At least he did not arrest me. But he stated: This would be a difficult step for me to take. After my visit with him, I went home to see my family. At that time it was announced that a curfew was in effect in Moscow. As I made my way home I saw tanks. Returning to the headquarters, I saw that the tanks had begun to move towards the center. I tried to reach Achalov, minister of defense, by phone, but could not get through to anybody. Finally I reached Grachev: "Pavel Sergeyevich, there are reports out of the White House that it will be stormed." He was already alerted and said: "They are simply waiting to see who is the first to lose his nerve. But there has been no order as such."

Grachev stated that he would not participate in a storm. Neither would Gromov lead the internal troops. I asked: "What if the order comes down all the same, what will you do?" "I will blow myself to kingdom come." And I to him: "Pavel Sergeyevich, if such an order comes, I will go personally to the one who issued it, no matter where he is. And I will say the following: I have just now launched two bomber aircraft. If this order is not revoked and I am not present at my command post in 20 minutes, the bombs will fall right where we are located." That is about the way the situation was. I do not know whether things would have reached the bombing stage, but for sure they would have gotten to the point of such a conversation with those who might have given the order.

[O. BLOTSKIY, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA special correspondent] General Lopata, former deputy commander of the Northern Group of Forces, would constantly declare: "We are the Army of Russia." Suddenly he disappears, then surfaces as deputy minister of defense of Ukraine, and tells me: "We are the Army of Ukraine." In other words, he quietly changed his oath.

[Ye. SHAPOSHNIKOV] I am categorically opposed to the taking of any oath—whether Ukrainian, Belarusian, Russian, Uzbek, or anything else—by someone who has already sworn an oath. Do you recall the officers' assembly of 17 January of last year? I stated clearly and precisely there in the name of Yeltsin and Nazarbayev: "Comrade officers serving in Ukraine, you cannot swear the oath a second time. A place will be found for you in Russia and Kazakhstan."

[P. FISHER, Carnegie Foundation (United States)] How do you see Russia's role in the international arms market? How are reforms moving along in the CIS Army and the Russian Army?

[Ye. SHAPOSHNIKOV] A sufficiently powerful military-industrial complex was established in the USSR inferior to none other in the world. This is one of our achievements. When conversion was declared and literally one week later specialists from the CPSU Central Committee began making the rounds of military plants and asking why conversion was not underway—this was a cavalry raid, and not reform of the military-industrial complex.

Here is my personal position on it. As soon as we agreed on conversion (and it is necessary), as the Cold War started to recede, and the threat of total nuclear war also moved aside, it was not necessary to cut short military production output, but rather to continue it, and sell arms which would not be used against us. There has always been a demand for our weapons. And the proceeds should be used not to purchase sausages, but to create production lines for the output of consumer products. A great deal has been done with respect to reforms, but still more needs to be done. It is not the task of a single day, nor even a year. First and foremost we need a solid legislative and material base. Otherwise this is not reform, but experimentation.

[A. UDALTSOV] Let us continue our discussion of arms. Clearly the Ministry of Defense has always been the general client for the defense industry. Who is the client today? Who monitors improvements and developments in military equipment? What level is this at today?

[Ye. SHAPOSHNIKOV] Yes, the Ministry of Defense was the client. But that is not all there is to it. I will explain. Gorbachev phones me one day: "Yevgeniy Ivanovich, have such-and-such a specialist into your office. He has some interesting ideas." A rather well-prepared, intelligent man comes to see me and relates his concept of prolonged nuclear war. Certain weapons are required for this war, and he has already spent 10 million on them. What is a prolonged nuclear war? There was one Chernobyl, but to this day we suffer in torment from it... Little by little I convinced the professor that his concept was not suitable. And we had a great many such specialists. When I became minister of defense, I ordered that a selection be made of the most research-intensive and promising areas with respect to building weapons, and people be designated to work on them. We had dozens of enterprises working on a single topic. On one and the same topic! At that time, nobody knew a budget, nobody took it into account. The bag is open—grab how much you want from it. Justify the expenses, and that's all there is to it. Today the Russian Ministry of Defense is the main client. True, certain leaders of the Russian Federation say we must shift to bilateral relations with the CIS countries. But really now! You can shift to bilateral relations with respect to oil, coal, gas, cotton, grain, and timber. But 560 enterprises work on the

production of a MIG-29 aircraft—of which 520 are in the territory of Russia and 40—in territory of the other CIS states. You can talk about the Navy, about tanks, about air defense systems. About the same proportion exists everywhere.

So what now—Russia must reach agreement with each CIS state on electronic tubes, rivets, and wheels? We cannot do it this way. I propose a different concept—establish an interstate corporation within the CIS framework for production and development of the main varieties of military production output. I think this is the only way to go about it.

[K. BELYANINOV, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA special correspondent] There is information in the military procuracy that with the assistance of military air assets of the Western Group of Forces, on the one hand, strategic raw materials and metals are being illegally transported out of Russia to the West, and on the other hand, toxic waste is being shipped into Russia. And that this “business” involves the highest echelons of the Western Group of Forces. Can you comment on this?

[Ye. SHAPOSHNIKOV] Let me say something about commercialization. When I became USSR minister of defense, the MEK [expansion unidentified] was formed, headed by Silayev. We are approaching winter, no one has approved the budget, and the Army has to live. I issue a directive on economic activity of the Armed forces. Look, we have 500-kilometer trips being made by vehicles. Several dozen vehicles are assembled. Why send them off empty?

Secondly, there is a great deal of vacant land—airfields, proving grounds, tank ranges... Conclude contracts with the kolkhozes nearby. Lease this land, harvest the crop together. I created a center under the Ministry of Defense with the unfortunate name “Commercial.” Being aware of the plans for reducing the Armed Forces, we looked at what equipment was outdated, what was unsuitable for us, and provided the information to government structures so they could sell the excess and give the Army a certain portion. I am against the Armed Forces itself selling arms. That is not our concern. That directive remained in existence just a few months because, first of all, we were inadequately prepared in the economic sense; secondly, certain people thought they could do anything they desired. In April I prohibited both economic and commercial activity in the Armed Forces. As far as military transport aircraft are concerned, to the extent that I am aware, Grachev prohibited them from engaging in commercial activity after a catastrophe occurred with one of the planes loaded with cargo.

Everything necessary for the Russian Armed Forces is being shipped from the Western Group of Forces. As far as toxic substances are concerned, I do not believe we have come so far that we are importing somebody else's waste. But there exist our own toxic substances which were in the Western Group of Forces. You know

how pointedly the Germans raise questions concerning the ecology. Leaving Germany, you just about have to change the soil. Perhaps that is what they are talking about.

[G. TSITRINYAK, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA columnist] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, would you tell us—what is the percentage of generals and senior officers in the American and our Army? Please do not say you do not know these figures.

[Ye. SHAPOSHNIKOV] All the same, I am not going to cite figures. But I will state that the percentage is not in our favor. Look at what is happening with us. Even the chief huntsman of the Armed Forces was a general. In June 1991 Gorbachev conducted a conference on defense. He asked Yazov: “So how many generals do we have?” “1,961.” Gorbachev replied with satisfaction: “So, we are reducing?” “Yes sir, we are reducing.” And the conversation ended here. I remember this figure. After becoming minister of defense, I inquired as to how many generals we had. It turned out there were about 3,000 in August 1991. I decided to look into this. Some 750 generals had served out their designated terms. There was a provision to retire major generals at age 55, colonel generals at 60... I issued a directive: First of all, discharge these 750 individuals. We can take in fresh cadre in their place. But it was also proposed to do this judiciously, so as not to dismay the cadre.

[E. Simmons, TIME MAGAZINE (United States)] It is being said today that Ukraine cannot maintain its nuclear missiles. And Ukraine responds: This is because Russia is not providing us the necessary spare parts. What can you say in this regard?

[Ye. SHAPOSHNIKOV] There was this friction before January. Until the presidents of Russia and Ukraine met in Moscow. A communique was signed as a result of the meeting, which contained three tasks for the governments of these states. The first was to work out an agreement on guarantees, as required by Ukraine. Russia would provide such guarantees when the agreement was ratified. Secondly—on compensation for the weapons, which is today termed “property” in Ukraine. And thirdly—on technical, guaranteed, authorial oversight of the condition of the missiles in Ukraine territory. A month was allotted to these three provisions. Right now, one has already been signed—the third, the one that interests you. The problem lies in whose weapons these are. If they are Ukrainian, then on what basis will Russia maintain them?

[D. MOLCHANOV, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA special correspondent] Ninety percent of all the problems we have to resolve today are the result of the disintegration of the USSR. How do you look at the Belovezha Agreements today?

[Ye. SHAPOSHNIKOV] There is no sharp difference between my feelings then and now. You realize that even prior to the August putsch, it was clear that the Union was on its last legs. Although it is painful for me to say

this. It is stipulated in the Union Constitution that every nation has the right to self-determination, up to the point of separation. You were witnesses to the struggle for supremacy of republic laws over Union laws. You can confirm that following the August events, many republics recoiled from such a center.

You can understand my feelings as a normal individual. When I was present at sessions of the State Soviet, including at Novo-Ogarevo, when I saw where we were headed, when I saw that the Ukrainians had stopped attending these sessions entirely, I understood—this is it. Sovereignization had proceeded to the extent that—somehow, inside I was prepared for everything. For the first time, I heard the Commonwealth mentioned in the interpretation of a tripartite union.

I came out in favor of there being at least some entity. And I see the state of affairs as a new quality of cooperation among our fraternal peoples, without dictate from the center, and without ideological narrow-mindedness. I think this will happen with time.

Military Aspects of Kurils Issue

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[Article by Capt 1st Rank Boris Nikolayevich Makeyev, Cand Naval Sci, senior scientific associate, Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations: "The Kuril Problem: The Military Aspect"]

[Text] The territorial dispute over the Southern Kurils—Iturup, Kunashir and Shikotan islands and the Habomai island chain—has presently become one of the most acute issues of Russian foreign policy.

In order to achieve a correct understanding of the situation that has currently evolved in regard to the problem of Japan's so-called "northern territories," among which it includes this group of islands in the Kuril chain, the Russian public must be made aware of all aspects of this problem. The aspect of international law, the economic aspect and the military aspect are the principal ones. I would like to devote attention mainly to the military strategic side of the issue—the most complex and the least known to the lay reader.

The historical diplomatic and legal aspects were recently illuminated in detail by the press, and there is no need to recall the known facts or continue the debate as to who first set foot on the islands, and how past treaties are to be interpreted. Therefore without making an excursion into the history of the development and use of this land, and into the relevant treaty relations, I will note only the military side of the issue. We know that in 1855 Russia ceded to Japan the group of islands south of the Kuril chain, and in 1875 the rest of the Kuril Islands, in exchange for the right of full possession of the island of

Sakhalin, which prior to this was under joint jurisdiction. However, as a result of its treacherous attack upon Russia, Japan asserted its right to half of this island, thus abrogating the main part of the 1875 treaty. The logic is simple—a victorious war eliminates all former territorial agreements. But the same logic was also embodied in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, which deprived Japan of the right to the Kuril Islands and the island of Sakhalin, returning them to Russia. Consequently there is nothing extraordinary in that Russia enjoys possession of the Kuril Islands as a result of conquering them in 1945. The United States and many European countries and, as I mentioned above, even Japan itself acquired new territories in the wars.

At the same time history is abundant with examples of certain powers consciously exchanging particular territories for economic, political and strategic benefit. Always in such cases they had to give up something—in principle, countries never have any extra or unneeded territory. It is important that what is acquired in exchange compensates for what is lost.

Understanding the instability and insufficiency of the grounds upon which the justice and lawfulness of its territorial claims from the standpoint of prior treaties rest, Japanese diplomacy is striving to shore up these grounds by the thesis that USSR's entry into the war against Japan in 1945 was illegal. Two versions are offered in this case. The first proclaims that the Soviet Union violated a neutrality pact signed between the USSR and Japan on 13 April 1941.

However, a thorough analysis would show that the Japanese side itself failed to adhere to this pact, and provided sufficient grounds for its denunciation by the Soviet Union. Here are some of the facts. During the war between the USSR and Germany, the Japanese Army violated the border 779 times, Japanese aviation invaded the Soviet Union's airspace 433 times, and the Japanese Navy unlawfully detained 178 and sank 18 Soviet merchant vessels. We know from stenographer's reports of imperial conferences of 1941 published in Japan that the Japanese military leadership was making preparations for an attack upon the Soviet Union, and that a date was even specified—29 August 1941. Thus Japan did not feel itself bound by the neutrality pact, and what restrained it from an attack upon the USSR was not the pact but a huge grouping of armed forces which the Soviet Union was forced to maintain at its Far Eastern borders, thus weakening its forces on the Soviet-German front. In such a situation the neutrality pact between Japan—an ally of Germany—and the USSR—an ally of USA and England, which were fighting against Japan, lost meaning. The lawfulness of the Soviet Union's entry into the war with Japan raises no doubt.

The second version—that the war with Japan was the result of Stalin's "imperial policy," and not an objective necessity for the anti-Hitler coalition in the Second World War—is not sufficiently persuasive either. The initiative of the USSR's participation in the war with

Japan belonged to Stalin, and not to the leaders of Great Britain and the USA. While the Allies made the desirability of this variant known on several occasions, the difficult situation on the Soviet-German front made it impossible.

In 1943 the Soviet leadership promised the Allies to satisfy their request of assistance in the war with Japan, but it was unable to move these promises to a practical plane until 1945, when the defeat of fascist Germany no longer left any doubts. An agreement reached at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 declared that "the leaders of the great powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that two or three months after Germany's surrender and the conclusion of the war in Europe, the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan on the side of the Allies...."

Despite the difficult situation in the country and the enormous losses suffered in the war with Hitler's Germany, the USSR honorably fulfilled its obligations to the Allies. Such are the facts that make groundless the attempts by some Japanese diplomats to cast doubt upon the lawfulness and objective necessity of the USSR's participation in Japan's final destruction. Its aggressive policy, its participation in the World War II on the side of fascist Germany and its defeat in this war deprive it of both a legal and a moral right to approach the issue in the form of demands to "return" its northern territories.

Without denying the existence of a territorial problem between Russia and Japan, and without supporting the positions of the extremist interpretation of this issue, we should still consider that if our country opts to transfer the Southern Kurils to Japan, this would be an act of good will having the goal of normalizing our relations with our Far Eastern neighbor, rather than satisfying its supposedly legal claims.

Only a position of this sort in negotiations will make it possible to conduct them in the channel of a warming international climate and mutual concessions.

The operational significance of the Southern Kurils is an important military aspect of the Kuril problem. Without rendering this significance absolute, we should note the principal factors associated with the destinies of these islands, factors having a definite influence upon Russia's national security and its defense potential.

Talking in general, loss of these islands will create a serious breach in the unified defense system of Russia's maritime region, reduce the security of the forces of the Pacific Fleet and the possibilities of their deployment in the Pacific Ocean, and violate the parity of strategic deterrent forces due to a decrease in their naval component's ability to resist the enemy in this region.

Let me make the qualification straight off that we do not intend to view Japan as a probable adversary and conduct our military strategic analysis in the spirit of the times of the cold war; but we should not be prisoners of

the political situation of only the present, and as with our colleagues in the West, we will analyze it on the basis of the worst case scenario.

In this approach it becomes evident to us that loss of the Southern Kurils will doubtlessly weaken our country's defense capabilities in a sector containing the most developed part of the Russian Far East. We lose an advantageous springboard from which to repel aggressive actions by Japan, which cannot be excluded in military strategic planning.

The island of Hokkaido, which is directly contiguous with the region, is still viewed by the military political leadership of the USA and Japan as the principal springboard for escalation of military operations in the Far East in the event of a military conflict in our country. In this connection a contingent of more than 50,000 Japanese troops, containing three infantry and one tank division and possessing approximately 700 tanks, 800 artillery and mortar systems, up to 90 warplanes and around 10 antiship missile launchers, are deployed on this island. A tunnel built between Hokkaido and Honshu permits rapid build-up of this grouping (by up to five divisions per day). Reliance upon an insular springboard in the Southern Kurils would to a certain degree facilitate repulsions of assault landings upon the island of Sakhalin and the southern part of Maritime Kray from the island of Hokkaido.

With the loss of the islands of Kunashir and Iturup, the Sea of Okhotsk will cease being our own inland sea, from the standpoint that a natural barrier, which the Kuril chain is, blocking free access of the adversary's naval forces to our shores from the Pacific Ocean, is breached.

The security of the Russian Pacific Fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk in relation to a surprise attack by the adversary's carrier and submarine forces decreases. The defense capabilities of our warships in this region will suffer. Surface forces require air cover, without which they do not have a sufficient ability to resist enemy aviation. The problem of protecting them from the air must be solved by including aircraft carriers within the composition of the task forces. Given the difficult position of our economy, the programs for instruction of aircraft carriers may be abandoned. Consequently the role of air defense fighter aviation, which can provide cover to the ships from coastal airfields, rises dramatically. If we cede the Southern Kurils, on which air defense systems exist and the conditions allowing for building them up have been established, our ships would be deprived of air cover in this important region, and they would suffer large losses in a crisis. With the loss of the Southern Kurils, with their navigable straits that are open year-round, deployment of our naval forces in the Pacific Ocean will become significantly more complicated. The need for such deployment still exists, especially in regard to submarines armed with ballistic missiles possessing a range of fire that would preclude their use from inland water basins. General-purpose forces must also be deployed together with these strategic forces

in order to support their actions in the vicinities of fire positions. Moreover deployment of missile submarines must proceed with maximum covertness. Otherwise a detected submarine would be tracked, and it would be unable to accomplish its mission. Access of submarines to the ocean through other straits in the northern part of the Kuril chain does not provide for the necessary covertness, since they are monitored by permanent American sonar systems, and in addition, navigating them is a complex task.

Submarines, which carry missiles with an effective range that allows them to be used from the basin of the Sea of Okhotsk, will also suffer in their covertness and ability to resist the enemy upon transfer of the Southern Kurils to Japan, because this sea would then become more open to penetration by the enemy's antisubmarine warfare forces.

As we know, these ballistic missile submarines are part of the strategic deterrent forces, the parity of which is governed by the corresponding agreements. Unfortunately, however, this parity is considered only from the standpoint of equality of nuclear warheads of the missiles of both sides, and it does not account for different conditions of their use.

Reduction of the ability of our missile submarines to resist the enemy owing to causes indicated above can lead to significant losses of these submarines, violate quantitative parity and create favorable possibilities for effective use of nuclear weapons by the opposing side.

There are also other factors that are negative from a military point of view that would come into play in the event of transfer of the Southern Kurils to Japanese jurisdiction: for example, reduction of the system keeping the aerial and naval situation under observation due to the loss of huge radar complexes stationed on these islands, a decrease in the range of our land-based aviation due to loss of airfields and fuel dumps created there for the purposes of refueling airplanes along their flights routes, and so on.

We have been dwelling on the main problems, and they permit the conclusion that in the event of transfer of the Southern Kurils to Japan, our country would suffer a tangible military setback.

However, this does not mean that we need to reject any efforts to find a mutually acceptable solution by which to normalize our relations with Japan, including by fixing territorial boundaries. But the solution to these problems cannot be viewed from a narrow aspect, without regard to the overall problems of strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

The ideas presented here in regard to the military aspects of the Kuril problem deserve the most serious attention. There is no doubt that under otherwise equal conditions, it would be better to have the islands than not to have them. However, it is important to estimate precisely how

essential their strategic role is, and whether this role outweighs other arguments—political and economic—in favor of a concession.

In particular, we need to consider that even now, the Sea of Okhotsk is not in its entirety a Russian inland water basin. Its southern coast is made up of the Japanese island of Hokkaido, on which according to our General Staff Japan's huge Northern Army and U.S. units are stationed. These forces are capable of providing support from shore to a penetration by naval forces into the Sea of Okhotsk through channels south of Sakhalin and Kunashir.

Furthermore, if in the opinion of the General Staff "our possibilities for promptly reinforcing the Kuril grouping (in a time of danger)...are extremely limited, and are practically nonexistent if military operations should begin," then the role of Russian units on the island is not all that great: How many hours would a garrison of 7,000 (equipped with 40 tanks and 30 airplanes) be able to hold out against ground forces and aviation of an opponent with tenfold superiority backed by attack carriers and assault landing formations?

Some military estimates suggest that the adversary possesses the possibility for conducting a naval assault landing operation in quick time to seize the Kuril Islands. Moreover it cannot be excluded that the enemy's carrier and amphibious forces would penetrate through other navigable channels.

That's on one hand. On the other, we should not exaggerate the danger of blows from the sea on the part of the USA and Japan against the Russian Far East. Under the conditions of the Pacific theater of military operations, creation of the necessary groupings would require a sizable period for force build-up, and the effectiveness of the actions of these forces would be determined not only by their composition but also by possible countermeasures by the other side. Recall that in early 1991, 10 divisions and over 1,000 airplanes and six carriers were launched against Iraq after half a year of preparations. And this was with total superiority of the anti-Iraq coalition in the air and at sea. And Russia is no Iraq. We have around 900 war planes, 60 large ships and 90 multipurpose submarines (of them, over 40 are nuclear-powered) in the Far East. There are another 800 airplanes in regions bordering on China. There are up to half a million troops, over 20,000 units of armored equipment and 15,000 artillery weapons. If for some reason this is not enough, then one division and an air regiment on the Kurils are not going to be much help either.

The viability of missile submarines is an extremely serious issue, inasmuch as it affects global strategic parity and stability. However, in light of the above, their security is not guaranteed even now. We currently have 38 missile submarines in the Northern Fleet and 24 in the Pacific. According to the new strategic arms reduction treaty (dated June 1992), their total number will

decrease to 23-25. The problem of protecting strategic submarines in the Sea of Okhotsk may be eliminated altogether by concentrating them in the Northern Fleet. There are a number of serious operational and tactical considerations arguing in favor of this variant.

In the current political situation, such ideas might appear to be an anachronism from the times of the cold war. Nonetheless, our military specialists are correct in appealing to us not to close our eyes to the stern realities of the strategic balance. The other side approaches this issue extremely cautiously and pragmatically. The strategic realities must be changed purposefully, and moreover, this should be done on a bilateral basis.

This brings us to the most important consideration. It follows directly from estimates of the General Staff and the Russian naval command, even if it is not always possible to agree with them in a number of aspects. If we wish to continue to maintain the existing strategic situation in the future, it would not make any sense to transfer the islands to Japan, even if we consider that the Southern Kurils have limited military significance. Such an action can be taken only as an **inseparable element of fundamental reconstruction of strategic relations in that region**, as a result of which the USA and Japan would cease their existence as hypothetical opponents of Russian and Asia. This is something that can become the basis for determining Russia's policy in this matter.

As a first step, the lesser Kuril chain (Shikotan and Habomai), which possesses significantly less military significance than the islands of Kunashir and Iturup, could be transferred to Japan in accordance with an agreement ratified in 1956 (and illegally denounced by Moscow in 1960). Concurrently a peace treaty could be signed and the parameters of restructuring the political, military and economic relations of these two countries would be established.

Jurisdiction over the other two islands is a much more complex and lengthy business. In exchange for recognition of Japanese sovereignty over them, Tokyo should recognize Russia's special military and economic interests, and agree to allow Russian facilities to remain there for, let us say, another 10-15 years. Japan would pledge not to interfere in any way in their function, and to never locate its own or foreign military bases and facilities on any of the islands. The Russian military structures would then be eliminated in stages, and it would depend upon fulfillment of other terms of the treaty.

In particular these obligations must be combined with measures to reduce the armed forces of Japan, the USA and Russia in the Far East, and with agreements on curtailing the activities of air and naval forces (especially antisubmarine and airborne assault forces) and on regulating exercises and confidence-building measures.

In the future, total demilitarization may be achieved of not only the four islands but also the entire Kuril archipelago, Hokkaido and Sakhalin. Establishment of interaction among armed forces, and primarily of naval forces, in

maintaining peace and repelling aggression in the region and in protecting lines of communication should be foreseen within the framework of a system of regional security in which other countries might participate.

Under these conditions, extensive possibilities will also open up for economic cooperation between Russia and Japan, beginning with the Southern Kurils and with subsequent inclusion of the entire Far East and Siberia in the system of economic integration of the Asia-Pacific region.

It stands to reason that the opinion of the local civilian population should be heeded when it comes to developing the mechanism by which to transfer the islands. Those who remain behind must be guaranteed all rights (including property rights), and those who leave must be fully compensated. Compensation for losses and expenses must also be foreseen in relation to relocated Russian military and economic facilities.

The deadline for final solution of the Kuril problem will depend to a significant extent both on the degree of "national patriotic" sentiments in Russian society and on the readiness of the local population to accept a change in the status of their territories. In all cases I believe that we should not create a direct relationship between economic aid from Japan and solution of its territorial problems at Russia's expense, since this would sit in the mass consciousness as "squandering of Russian soil," which could have a most negative influence upon the country's internal political situation and the authority of its government.

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Military Law Provisions Clarified By MOD Specialists

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11 Mar 93 p 2

[Article by Oleg Vladynkin: "'Military Package' of Laws: Answers, Explanations, Consultations"]

[Text] KRSNAYA ZVEZDA continues to explain the provisions of the Russian Federation's new military laws. The two preceding articles (March 3 and 6 of this year) spurred interest among readers who would like to clarify aspects of the legal acts that have taken effect.

Today we are publishing answers to questions about the law "On Compulsory Military Obligation and Military Service." After summarizing the most similar questions from readers, we put them to specialists from several directorates of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense.

Perhaps the largest number of questions are prompted by Articles 20 and 21 of the law, which concern citizens' right to exemption or deferment from conscription for military service. The following question arises especially often: Will exemptions be mandatory for youths with one parent or two parents who have reached pension age?

We contacted the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff for an answer to this question and a number of others. Colonel-General Vitaliy Bogolov, chief of the Main Organization-Mobilization Directorate, reported that if a young man of draft age takes care of a parent who is retired and manages the entire household, and there is no one else legally obligated to support that family member in need of care and to look after him, then that young man is granted the right to exemption from conscription.

Conscription commissions will decide this matter on an individual basis. The commissions have the right to take this decision. But it should be pointed out here that in a situation in which a retired mother resides, for example, alone in Moscow, while the son subject to conscription is a student or employed in some other city and is not, for all practical purposes, providing constant help and care for that single parent, a conscription commission might not grant that youth an exemption. Under Article 21 of the law, an exemption cannot be granted to a young man whose parents have reached pension age but are totally supported by the state.

Students ask if the right to an exemption can still be granted to those of them who, for various reasons, interrupted their studies at a higher educational institution but later resumed them or enrolled at a different institution.

No, an exemption cannot be granted in such cases. Based on point b of part two of Article 21, such students can be called up for military service since they are no longer persons who are enrolled for the first time in the daytime division of an institution offering professional education. The only exception is situations when a student has changed his place of study by filing an official transfer to another higher educational institution of the same type, or when a student has been granted an academic leave for valid reasons in the prescribed procedure.

How will the now legally mandatory military training of citizens be carried out, and where will they be able to obtain the necessary defense training? After all, school curriculums no longer offer the subject "basic military training," not even the renamed and simplified version that still existed a couple of years ago.

It is indeed true that state general-education institutions provided preconscription training to their pupils up till May 1991. The abolishment of that course by decree of the Council of Ministers had an extremely negative effect on the level of young people's psychological and physical readiness to fulfill their constitutional duty, officials of the Russian Federation General Staff's Main Organization-Mobilization Directorate explained to us.

Under the newly adopted law "On Compulsory Military Obligation and Military Service," general-education schools and secondary vocational schools will introduce mandatory training of citizens for military service. The General Staff, in conjunction with relevant ministries and departments, has drafted a decree of this matter and

submitted it to the Russian Federation government for consideration. It is proposed that the subject be known as "Fundamentals of State Defense and Security of Citizens' Vital Activities." It is to be introduced in the next school year.

The articles of the law concerning voluntary military service are not being overlooked either. Do there now exist standard documents for the three types of contracts specified in points a, b, and c in part one of Article 33?

Col-Gen Bogolov responded to these questions as follows. The contracts that citizens who are volunteering for military service will conclude with the Russian Federation Armed Forces have now been drafted. Sample documents will be appended to the Statute on the Procedure For Performing Military Service that is being drafted for the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet's consideration.

A citizen who signs a contract will assume certain responsibilities. Above all, he must study the relevant legislation and promise to strictly observe and comply with its requirements. He specifies the term of his service (3.5 years or 10 years), and the terms under which he is joining the Armed Forces. And here he has a choice. If he signs a contract under point a, this means he agrees to serve in the army or navy in general, with no other terms specified. If he signs a contract under point b, then he specifically identifies the military unit in which he intends to serve. And if he signs a contract under point c, this gives him the right to specify what post he intends to hold and in what unit or military institution.

The commander of a military unit retains the right to accept or reject the terms set forth by the volunteer. If the unit commander accepts, he signs the document on behalf of the Armed Forces, thereby also assuming certain responsibilities with respect to supporting the serviceman, making sure he has everything necessary for normal service, and so on. Certain special terms that relate to place of stationing and that are in general characteristic of a given unit may also be stipulated.

If a contract is subsequently dissolved at the initiative of either side, the contract, as a full-fledged legal document, serves as the basis for resolving any disputes in the courts. The specific mechanism for dissolving a contract will be set forth in the Statute on the Procedure for Performing Military Service.

Under Article 30 of the law, the age limit up to which a citizen is entitled to first sign a contract is 40. True, here we need to point out one important aspect. Article 32 says that requirements with respect to persons who volunteer for military service are to be set forth by the Russian Federation Defense Minister. In practice, this will mean that rather tough restrictions will be established for many military specialties—for example, with respect to psychological and moral suitability, physical fitness, and state of health generally. In reality, only young and physically strong people who are in perfect health will be able to sign contracts to serve in these specialties.

Military school cadets ask why they can sign contracts only after finishing their first year of study, instead of being able to do this immediately upon enrolling at a military educational institution.

We put this question to Colonel Aleksandr Flyagin, a department head in the Main Personnel Training and Military Educational Institutions Directorate. He explained that under the law, a youth can enroll at a higher educational institution only in the year during which he reaches the age of 17. However, citizens' full legal accountability begins at the age of 18. And this is the first reason why cadets can sign contracts only after one year of study, as set forth in part two of Article 31 of the law. After all, the overwhelming majority of those who study at higher military educational institutions reach their 18th birthday either at the end of the first year of study or after completing it.

The second reason has to do with the fact that not all of them are sufficiently committed to their choice of a military vocation. After getting a taste of the rigors of army life and encountering difficulties, some of them request discharge in the first few months of study. Incidentally, the largest number of discharge requests come during the first year of study, owing to a lack of desire to study. In addition, commanding officers and instructors, during the first year of teaching their wards, can with much greater certainty ascertain and issue recommendations as to whether a given cadet is capable of mastering the higher educational institution's curriculum and subsequently becoming a professional soldier.

And finally, a question asked by Armed Services veterans who called our newspaper. On several occasions, they have seen certain officers of the Ministry of Defense central staff on television wearing a new Russian Army uniform. Yet they read in Article 38 of the law that military uniforms and insignia are to be confirmed by the Russian Federation president. Has he done so?

The situation was clarified by Major Andrey Nekrakh, a deputy department chief in the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Central Stores Directorate. When the new military uniforms were designed and samples made, they were presented to the Ministry of Defense collegium and later to the president. They were approved in both cases, for the most part. Only the question of part of the uniform insignia remains undecided, since it is supposed to use the Russian Federation emblem, which has yet to be confirmed by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet.

Nevertheless, on October 24, 1992, the president signed Directive Pr. 1873, instructing the Ministry of Defense to draft an edict on introducing the new uniforms in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The same document authorizes the start of an experimental measure to gradually make and introduce individual items of the new uniforms and insignia for servicemen. And so the officers whom the veterans saw on television had changed uniforms on a completely legal basis.

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Aviation in Bringing Effective Fire onto the Enemy


93UM0444A Moscow VOYENNNYY VESTNIK
in Russian No 12, Dec 92 (signed to press 20 Nov 93)
pp 30-33

[Article by Maj-Gen Avn Ye. Kashitsin and Col V. Kharitonov, candidate of military sciences and docent: "Aviation in Bringing Effective Fire onto the Enemy"]

[Text] The combat operations in the Persian Gulf reconfirmed one of the leading trends in the theory and practice of armed warfare—increasing the role of aviation in ground forces' operations. Before our eyes there is taking place an ever-increasing involvement of airspace and even outer space in the sphere of armed confrontation. It is not by chance that we call modern operations "air-land" or "three-dimensional" operations.

As we know, in Operation Desert Storm aviation carried out around 80 percent of all fire missions, however, basically on the strategic level. Thus, on 38 of the 42 days of the war aviation conducted combat operations independently and only on four days within the framework of the air-land battle. The articles we have seen, as a rule, examine the air campaign, while the procedure of using aviation by the combined-arms commander is of interest to the ground forces. Figure 1 will help us study this. It shows two graphs: the top one is the density of distribution of the percentage participation of weapons at the disposal of the commander by depth of missions; the bottom one is the density of distribution of enemy weapons in a typical disposition of forces in depth.

Fig. 1. Distribution of Fire Potential



An analysis of its upper half indicates that only frontal aviation and the missile troops can be used beyond the artillery's range of fire. In doing so, the percentage participation of aviation reaches 90 percent.

From the lower half it follows, first of all, that up to 60 percent of an army corps' potential is allocated to the reserve. Second, long-range weapons comprise a considerable portion (up to 20 percent) of the enemy's firepower—army aviation, Lance operational-tactical missiles, and ATACMS-type reconnaissance and strike systems. Due to this, they end up being categorized as operational-level objectives and, consequently, are destroyed during the course of gaining (holding) operational fire superiority.

Thus, frontal aviation is the main means of preventing and enemy operational maneuver and achieving (holding) operational fire superiority. When carrying out the first mission, it operates against the reserves, second echelons, and command and control posts. In the second case, it operates against Lance batteries, army aviation at staging areas, army corps support missile systems (ATACMS-type reconnaissance and strike systems), and troop and weapons command and control facilities.

The portion of frontal aviation forces not used in the strikes under the senior commander's plan may be used to prevent a maneuver of enemy troops during the course of the operation and, above all, to foil (delay) the advance of enemy follow-on forces.

It is apparent from the graphic that army aviation is often forced to operate in the zone of artillery fire, for it is here that the tactical fire missions are executed. Therefore, determining the order of its combat employment should be based primarily on the combat capabilities and qualities of aviation as a fire asset.

This also includes mobility that is superior to ground equipment, combined with a great depth of operations, a sufficiently high strike effectiveness (particularly against armored targets), and the ability to combine reconnaissance with engagement of the target. The experience of combat operations in the Persian Gulf convincingly shows that integrating reconnaissance, command and control, and electronic suppression assets in a single system with strike assets gives aviation a new quality.

Combat Employment of Aviation in the Defense

Let us emphasize at the start that we are considering a mobile defense to be the most typical methods of conducting a defense today. The missions of aviation are determined, naturally, by the missions of comprehensive effective engagement of the enemy. From the standpoint of employing aviation forces, the first two (fire interdiction of advance and deployment and fire support of the covering force), in our view, should be considered as a single whole. The basic goal here is to inflict maximum losses on the enemy's main body and delay its advance for the time necessary to organize a defense on the first defensive line.

The basic combat qualities of the helicopter (ground-attack aircraft) help best to achieve this goal. Thus, the mobility of aviation subunits of ground forces and the great depth of their operations make it possible to accomplish long-range effective engagement of the main body of the advancing enemy and ensure massing of fire on any axis. The situation taking shape also favors the effectiveness of combat employment: the large number of openly disposed tanks and other armored equipment in march, approach-march, and battle formations with large intervals and gaps in the latter, and also the possibility of preliminary reconnaissance of the terrain by helicopter crews for selecting ambush sites.

In addition, remote minelaying by helicopters looks tempting. It seems that their joint operations with mobile obstacle detachments will also be effective.

Fire repelling of an attack is organized when fighting for every line, for which the maximum possible number of weapons are used. However, this postulate does not apply to aviation. And the reasons for that are weighty. First, the appearance of helicopters over the forward-most defensive positions usually requires a suspension of artillery fire from indirect fire positions. Second, the advantages of aviation as a weapon asset are not fully utilized here. At the same time, even without aviation the ground troops are able to successfully oppose an enemy that has a 3:1 and, in favorable conditions, even greater numerical superiority. We believe that in the course of repelling the attack, ground forces' aviation can be used only to build up the efforts in the event of a threat of a breakthrough of the position (until the planned withdrawal of troops from it).

The goal fire support of the maneuver of troops from line to line is to support the breaking of contact (disengagement) by the main body and prevent the enemy from reaching the path of their withdrawal. Both ground-attack aircraft and helicopters may be used successfully to support the maneuver. They make strikes in short periods of time against the enemy's main body on any sector of the defense zone.

The basic method of combat operations by aviation subunits when accomplishing the missions of effective engagement examined above should be considered their on-call use from staging points and primary basing sites. Operations by helicopters from ambush sites should find widespread application.

As we know, effective engagement of the enemy when conducting counterattacks is accomplished with reference to offensive missions. The advantage of aviation over other weapon assets at the combined-arms commander's disposal is that it makes it possible to quickly create fire superiority over the enemy on the counterattack sector. In the course of preparation fire, it is better to use frontal aviation—it delivers a powerful bombing strike and sort of clears a corridor in the enemy's battle formation or at least weakens his forces considerably.

During the period of fire support of the counterattack, helicopters are more adapted for direct battlefield support.

This procedure for employing aviation also determines the modes of operations of its subunits. For ground-attack aircraft it is simultaneous strikes at a designated time; for helicopters it is on-call operations from the airborne alert zone (ambush sites).

A characteristic feature of ground forces' aviation is joint operations by helicopters and ground-attack aircraft as part of reconnaissance-strike groups. The latter can be used for strikes against the enemy's main body during its advance and deployment (including in the forward defense area), reinforcing the fire of defending units, assisting troops in eliminating penetrations, and supporting the withdrawal to a new line of defense. In addition, reconnaissance-strike groups engage (delay) enemy troops trying to bypass the area of combat operations and second-echelon units.

Combat Employment of Aviation in an Offensive

Remember that effective engagement of the enemy in an offensive is organized by periods. They include, as a rule, preparation fire for the assault, fire support of the assault, and close support of the advancing troops in the depth.

For the most part, preparation fire for the assault is done according to plan. This distinctive feature must be taken into account when planning employment of aviation, since it makes poor use of its main combat quality—mobility. In addition, a very difficult dust and smoke situation is created on the breakthrough sectors, which sharply reduces the effectiveness of airstrikes.

Moreover, employment of even all the available army aviation will add, at best, only an additional 10 percent to the avalanche of fire. Making a separate airstrike (with suspension of artillery fire) gives the enemy sort of a respite. First, helicopter strikes are not identical to artillery shellings in their effect on morale; second, the poor observation conditions, as was noted, adversely affect their effectiveness. In the end, the effectiveness of the pressure on the enemy is decreased.

Thus, it is not advisable and is simply incompetent from the professional standpoint to employ army aviation in preparation fire for the assault on the breakthrough sector where a sufficiently powerful artillery grouping is "working."*

Fire Support of the Assault. During the Great Patriotic War, success of a breakthrough was largely determined by the effectiveness of its artillery support, which, as a rule, was accomplished to a depth of 1.5-2 km. A rolling barrage combined with successive fire concentration became firmly established as its main method. This ensured a high momentum of the assault; however, with the transition to support by other methods, it dropped sharply: there was not enough firepower. The problem of its reinforcement was resolved by various methods—committing mobile groups to battle (at a depth of only


1.5-2 km), increasing the density of tanks and self-propelled artillery for direct infantry support, and with the appearance of radios on aircraft, by supporting the attacking troops by operations of ground-attack aircraft constantly over the battlefield.

With saturation of the modern defense with antitank weapons, the problem of effective engagement has become even more critical. Now, after suspension of support of the assault by methods of successive fire concentration (a creeping fire zone or rolling barrage), a large number of fire missions will appear on the battlefield which require immediate execution. Army aviation is the best means here.

In planning its participation in fire support of the assault, two phases must be distinguished. The first is when it is accomplished by the method of successive fire concentration (a creeping fire zone or rolling barrage); the second is when artillery switches to support by other means, the basis of which will be on-call engagement of unplanned targets.

In the first phase, it is as if the battle formations of the attacking troops are screened from the enemy by a curtain of fire (Figure 2). Using helicopters for direct support of the assault (i.e., at the forward edge of the battle area) during this time will be of no use.

Fig. 2. Fire Support of the Assault



With the transition to the second phase (as a rule, at the depth of the first-echelon battalion defense areas), artillery support becomes less effective, which has an immediate effect on the rate of advance. Thus, during World War II, a lag by the attacking forces of even two minutes behind the rolling barrage enabled the enemy to come to his senses and inflict significant losses on the tanks of the advancing troops and sometimes even break up the attack. Army aviation can be used successfully here to maintain the firepower. Operating from airborne alert zones or from ambush sites, combat helicopters, on the commands (target designation) of forward air controllers, subunit commanders, or independently, can quickly

suppress objects impeding the troop advance. Here the combat qualities of army aviation as a weapon asset are fully used—both the high mobility (fire pressure against a newly discovered target can be organized in two minutes) and the great effectiveness of fire.

Close Support Fire for Advancing Troops in the Depth. After breaking through the defense, attacking subunits strive to make broader use of various forms of maneuver and advance unevenly. According to calculations, at a rate of advance of 5 km per hour, only half of the artillery grouping can be used in massed delivery of fire; at 8 km per hour, only 30 percent can be used. Obviously, this period will require considerable expenditure of forces of army aviation. The basic method of its operations will be on-call strikes by flights (pairs) of helicopters from staging points from a readiness condition 1. This is because support from airborne alert zones and from ambush sites requires too many sorties. Only when the resistance increases (arrival at intermediate defensive lines, a water obstacle, and so forth) is it advisable to switch to air support with helicopters continuously located over the battlefield.

We should make special note of employing army aviation when repelling enemy counterattacks and counterstrikes. Thus, the enemy's desire for surprise and concentration of forces and assets on a selected axis can be successfully countered with group strikes by aviation subunits combined with using them for remote mining of the terrain. The main method of operations when performing this mission will be successive on-call strikes from the primary basing sites and staging points.

So, in a combined-arms engagement and operation, as a weapon asset aviation can be arbitrarily divided into two levels: operational (frontal aviation) and tactical (ground forces' aviation—helicopters and, in the future, ground-attack aircraft). The first, as a rule, accomplishes two operational missions: gaining (holding) operational fire superiority and preventing operational maneuver by the enemy. Helicopters and ground-attack aircraft are used for close fire support of the troops and, above all, in those phases of the battle when mobility plays a decisive role.

Footnotes

*In the opinion of the authors, the desire to use helicopters during the period of preparation fire for the assault is caused by the unjustified shift of the experience of the Great Patriotic War to today, and also by the desire to ensure the best conditions for showing the senior command authorities the effect of operations by aviation at exercises.

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Performance, Specifications of Su-24MR Reconnaissance Aircraft

93UM0424A Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian
No 1, Jan 93 pp 4-5

[Article by Mikhail Levin: "The 'Shtyks' and 'Shpils' of the 'SU'"]

[Text] The special-purpose Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft, demonstrated for the first time and painted in Russia's three colors, stood out on the parking area of the Experimental Design Bureau imeni P.O. Sukhoy. The MR was developed on the base of the Su-24M tactical bomber. It has a variable-sweep wing. It is designed for providing reconnaissance information to command authorities of the Ground Forces and Frontal Aviation and to the Navy on maritime axes. It can perform all-weather comprehensive aerial reconnaissance day or night at a wide range of altitudes and speeds to a depth of up to 400 km beyond the line of contact under opposition by enemy air defenses. It is equipped with an onboard BKR-1 reconnaissance system that ensures a high probability of detecting and identifying objects of military equipment, including dummy and camouflaged objects.

The Su-24MR can also be used for civilian purposes—assessing radiation contamination of the terrain and air in areas of nuclear power plants, detecting oil spills on land and on water, detecting forest fires, monitoring the condition of wooded areas, terrain mapping, and so forth.

At the air show, spectators learned that the Su-24MR has camera equipment for panoramic and oblique photography, and equipment for radar, infrared, and television reconnaissance. Removable pods house equipment for laser, electronic, and radiation reconnaissance. This equipment is controlled automatically and manually. The aircraft navigation system supports flight over a pre-programmed route, arrival at the reconnaissance area, and low-altitude flight with collision avoidance and terrain following.

Installed in the aircraft's nose section are a "Shtyk" side-looking radar, developed at the MNIIP Vega-M Scientific Production Association [NPO], and (in the lower part) an AP-402M panoramic aerial camera made at the Krasnogorsk Plant. In the lower part of the fuselage directly behind the cockpit is an A-100 oblique aerial camera, made by the same plant, and an infrared system made by the Geofizika Scientific Production Association is in the lower center part of the fuselage. A pod housing a "Shpil-2M" laser, developed at the Scientific Research Institute of Radio Optics, is hung on a center underfuselage suspension point. On the right outer underwing suspension point is a pod housing the "Efir-1M" radiation reconnaissance equipment. The "Shtyk" radar has a resolution of about 5 meters. The AP-402M aerial camera is the non-cycling prismatic type.

Table 1. Characteristics of AP-402 Panoramic Aerial Camera

Lens focal distance, mm	90.5
Lens aperture ratio	1:3.5...1:22
Frame size, mm	68 x 285
Width of coverage band, in fractions of altitude	12
Aerial photography film:	
—type	isopanchrom
—length, m	480
—width, mm	80
Weight of flight package, kg	62
Photographing interval, seconds	0.24-4.25
Terrain resolution from altitude of 400 m, m	0.3
Photographing altitude, m	100-1000

There is nothing similar to the Su-24MR among foreign tactical reconnaissance aircraft in comprehensiveness of reconnaissance information received. For example, the RF-4C aircraft, which are the basis of U.S. Air Force tactical reconnaissance aviation, use the AN/AAS-18 infrared set, the AN/APQ-102 side-looking radar, and several aerial cameras for vertical and oblique photography from high and low altitude. For electronic reconnaissance they use they AIL AN/ALQ-61 or Litton AN/ALQ-125 pod systems, but there is no laser or radiation reconnaissance equipment. Also, the American reconnaissance aircraft, lighter and with a fixed swept

wing, is significantly inferior to the Su-24MR in flight range and speed at low altitude.

The British Tornado GR.1A reconnaissance aircraft, also a modified fighter-bomber with a variable-sweep wing, is close to the Su-24MR in flight characteristics. But the Tornado GR.1A was conceived as a reconnaissance aircraft with retention of the combat capabilities and is equipped with only the panoramic and side-looking TIRRS (Tornado Infra- Red Reconnaissance System) in place of the cannons.

Direct processing of reconnaissance information does not take place on board the Su-24MR: the photographic information is delivered by dropping the photographic material developed on board the aircraft, and the rest is transmitted in a timely manner to the ground over wideband and narrowband radio channels.

The reconnaissance information relayed and delivered contains navigation data to reference it by coordinates of the aircraft's location and time. Receipt, processing, and decoding are done at a ground complex. This is realistic and, apparently, the only reliable approach for the existing equipment. (On the British Tornado GR.1A, the reconnaissance information received is recorded on a videotape and can be reproduced on a small TV display in the cockpit of the navigator-operator in nearly real time. This is the first aircraft in air forces of NATO countries with such a capability. However, during the Persian Gulf War in 1991, navigators rarely used the capability of monitoring reconnaissance information, because they were loaded down with performing navigation tasks and monitoring the enemy surface-to-air missile threat.)

Table 2. Characteristics of the Su-24MR

Dimensions	
—Wingspan at wing sweep of 16 degrees, m	17.63
—Wingspan at wing sweep of 69 degrees, m	10.36
—Aircraft length with pitot-static tube boom, m	24.53
—Aircraft height, m	6.19
—Wing area at wing sweep of 16 degrees, sq m	55.16
—Wing area at wing sweep of 69 degrees, sq m	51.0
Engines:	
—Number and type	2 AI-21F3A NPO Saturn
Stand thrust, kgf:	
—at full afterburner	2 x 11,200
—at maximum conditions	2 x 7,800
Weights and Loads:	
—Takeoff weight, kg:	
maximum permitted	39,700
normal	33,325
—Landing weight, kg:	
threshold	28,000
maximum	26,000

Table 2. Characteristics of the Su-24MR (Continued)

normal	25,035
Capacity of internal fuel tanks, liters	11,700
Flight data:	
—Mach number at high altitude	1.35
—Maximum flight speed at altitude of 200 m, km/hr:	
without external stores	1320
with "Shpil-2M" and "Efir-1M" pods and two R-60 missiles	1200
Practical operating radius at flight level 200 meters with varied speed (670 km/hr on section 200 km to the line of contact and 900 km/hr on remaining sections), with "Shpil-2M" and "Efir-1M" pods and two R-60 missiles, with jettisoning of missiles at half-way point, km:	
—without external fuel tanks	420
—with two 3000-liter fuel tanks, jettisoned after spending fuel	650
Ferry flight range over most favorable profile with two 3000-liter external fuel tanks (with jettison after spending fuel), km:	
—without in-flight refueling	2500
—with one in-flight refueling	4360
Limit load factor	6.5
Takeoff and landing characteristics on a concrete runway with wing sweep of 16 degrees, trailing edge flap setting of 34 degrees, and leading edge flap setting of 27 degrees, m:	
—takeoff run at normal takeoff weight	1100-1200
—landing run at normal landing weight with drag parachute and braking of wheels	1000-1100

Auxiliary fuel tanks with a capacity of 3000 liters each are mounted on the inner underwing points of the Su-24MR, and R-60 short-range air-to-air missiles with IR homing heads are mounted on the outer underwing points (for self-defense).

The Su-24MR is in the inventory of the Russia's Air Force, and by mid- 1992 it had not been delivered abroad.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Navy CINC Gromov Interviewed

PM1103140193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Mar 93 pp 1-2

[Interview with Admiral Feliks Nikolayevich Gromov, commander in chief of the Russian Navy, by Vladimir Aleksandrov; date and place of interview not stated: "Melancholy People Unsuitable for Navy:—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text]

Visiting card—Feliks Nikolayevich Gromov

Commander in chief of the Russian Federation Navy. An admiral. After graduating from the Pacific Higher Naval School he served in the Pacific and Northern Fleets and at the Leningrad naval base. He has been in command of a destroyer, a cruiser, and a squadron. He has been commander of the Northern Fleet and first deputy commander in chief of the navy.

He is married and has a son and a daughter.

[Aleksandrov] Feliks Nikolayevich, today it has become a habit to complain about difficulties. And at the same time we cannot pass over in silence the problems which the Navy is experiencing...

[Gromov] Indeed, times are hard and the Russian Navy has very many problems. Under these conditions there is no choice but to select the main avenue in our activity. The main thing, we believe, is to preserve the foundation of our navy: Its ships and officers' corps.

On the basis of the Russian Federation military doctrine which is being formed, and of which the naval concept is a component, we must make a realistic decision as regards the optimum combat force level for the navy and on this basis continue to resolve the problems facing us.

They include primarily the enhancement of the prestige of naval service and problems of ship repair—at present its provision level is only about 34 percent. Housing issues are acute—in the Navy something like 22,500 officers, warrant officers, and those on extended military service have no housing. We must also be concerned for those released into the reserve. The withdrawal of naval forces from the territory of the Baltic countries in accordance with existing accords remains a very important question.

At the same time the Navy is fulfilling the tasks of nuclear deterrence and the maintenance of an operational regime in its zone of responsibility. But for that it is essential to update the navy, although to do so the Russian Federation has only 64 percent of the ship

building capacities of the former Union. Budget appropriations for the Navy's development have also been substantially reduced.

[Aleksandrov] These are more problems of an economic order, so to speak. But after all there are also political problems: for instance, the fate of the Black Sea Fleet.

[Gromov] I believe that in the talks process Russia and Ukraine should consider the entire complex of problems of the Black Sea Fleet and the historical conditions in which it was created. And also the fact that everything connected with Sevastopol—the fleet's main base—is historically precious to the Russians.

During the recent working meeting in Kiev of state delegations of Russia and Ukraine, accords were reached on questions of the status of the command of the Black Sea Fleet and the financing of the fleet for the transitional period, although differences remain in approaches toward the solution of a number of problems.

The actual process of the talks on the Black Sea Fleet regarding very important problems like creating Black Sea Fleets of the Russian and Ukrainian navies, ensuring officers' social protection, and adopting a decision on dual citizenship should, I believe, proceed more actively.

[Aleksandrov] Among the political issues we cannot probably fail to touch on the situation connected with the withdrawal of naval forces from the Baltic countries. Is Russia not losing its positions in the Baltic?

[Gromov] The decision to withdraw troops from the Baltic countries reflects the real changes which have taken place since the formation of new states on the territory of the former Soviet Union. As a result the Baltic Fleet has in fact been deprived of three base points. The forces deployed there will be withdrawn and already are being withdrawn to the territory of Kaliningrad Oblast, to the Baltiysk naval base, and also to rayons of Leningrad Oblast and Kronshadt.

Naturally, that will affect the nature of the tasks resolved by the Baltic Fleet and its personnel. But I would consider it premature to speak of the weakening of Russia's positions in the Baltic Sea. The social problems connected with providing facilities for the naval forces which are being withdrawn are most perturbing. Both in the Baltic and the Caspian. Substantial capital investments will be required to provide amenities for the shore basing infrastructure and the provision of housing for the families of officers, ensigns, and warrant officers. Understandably, these problems cannot be resolved in six or twelve months...

[Aleksandrov] And what effect will the START II Treaty have on the Navy? Today one can hear the most diametrically opposed opinions on this subject...

[Gromov] For the Navy the START II Treaty has brought no radical changes in the question of reduction. In accordance with the START I Treaty we are continuing to withdraw strategic missile-carrying submarine

cruisers from the navy. At the same time it must be noted that the START II Treaty sets limits on the level of nuclear warheads for deployed SLBM's on both sides. The START I Treaty set similar restrictions in general for deployed ICBM's and SLBM's.

As a result by the year 2000 the United States will have reduced the number of warheads on its SLBM's 230 percent while Russia will have reduced them 60 percent. Under the START II Treaty each Trident-2 SLBM will be allowed four warheads although potentially they could be fitted with 12-14 warheads, as was the case during the testing of these missiles. As a whole the United States will have 18 missile carriers of the Ohio class with 432 deployed Trident-2 missiles, whose construction is now under way and will evidently continue through 1997.

The Russian Fleet will have 24 recently built nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines by the year 2000.

The role of the nuclear deterrent forces' naval component is increasing. All this naturally places a special responsibility on the Russian Navy for maintaining the strategic naval forces' level of combat readiness.

[Aleksandrov] Feliks Nikolayevich, you have already said that Russia has lost a substantial part of its ship building capacities. But you will agree that without a ship building program commensurate with the navy's requirements and the country's potential, the Russian Navy may, as they say, be back where it started...

[Gromov] The previous ship building program ceased to exist back in 1990. And in 1992 the financing of the building of ships and submarines was only for those enterprises which were on Russian territory. There have only been talks on completing the building of ships at Ukrainian ship building enterprises.

Considering all the changes which have taken place and Russia's economic potential, there has been a detailed elaboration of a new ship building program, which has been submitted to the government for examination. Here it should be borne in mind that the cycle of a ship's building—from planning to launching—is quite long. The existence of a substantiated and balanced ship building program will make it possible to ensure annual financing at all these stages.

[Aleksandrov] But before this program starts to be implemented the navy must rid itself of the ships and submarines which have been written off. The public is particularly worried by the use of the superannuated nuclear-powered ships. How is the navy coping with this problem?

[Gromov] As of 1 January 1993 something like 90 nuclear-powered submarines had been withdrawn from the Navy. The nuclear core has been removed from approximately one third of them. On the others this process is either under way or is planned.

It should be noted that the question of a state program for the utilization of nuclear submarines has been raised over five years. The Russian Government has now adopted decrees "on measures to organize the experimental utilization of submarines and surface ships withdrawn from the Navy" and "on a program of work for the comprehensive utilization of nuclear submarines withdrawn from the NAVY and of ships with nuclear power units belonging to the Russian Federation Ministry of Transport."

We have deliberately accelerated the withdrawal from the navy of a number of obsolete ships which on the one hand have lost their combat characteristics and on the other have for a number of objective reasons become somewhat dangerous to operate because they are obsolete. Nonetheless questions of preparing old ships for long-term storage and of ensuring safety, including radiation safety, demand our closest attention and further state decisions on financing.

[Aleksandrov] It is interesting that last year and this year the Russian Federation Navy has for the first time been rehearsing several elements of collaboration with ships of the NATO bloc in the Persian Gulf. How do you yourself assess this rapprochement of formerly opposing navies?

[Gromov] Our ships were and are now in the Persian Gulf region in accordance with the Russian Federation president's directive and the decision of the government. They operate independently and their main task is to demonstrate our presence in this region. Incidentally, some other navies also have just one ship each there.

The large ASW ship the Admiral Vinogradov has conducted joint exercises for communications, fueling, rescue at sea, and the deck landing of helicopters with representatives of the U.S., British, and French navies. Acceptable formulas for collaboration have been found and in rehearsing these tasks the necessary safety and mutual understanding have been ensured. The large ASW ship the Admiral Tributs is now in the Persian Gulf region.

As a whole it may be said that experience has been acquired which from the viewpoint of naval practise and internal law norms is of undoubted value.

[Aleksandrov] Service in the Navy has always been regarded in Russia as the lot of real men. The romance of the sea has always attracted young men. Has the number of men anxious to serve in the Navy not declined now?

[Gromov] In 1992 the intake of first-year cadets was ensured at the seven higher naval schools on Russian territory. Incidentally, something like 35 percent of the total number of cadets are the sons of servicemen.

Of course, adverse trends have not bypassed the cadres problem. The year of 1993 does not promise to be easy as regards the intake of cadets. That applies particularly to the standard and quality of their general education and

physical training. But nonetheless the traditional naval cities of Russia are still the main supplies of secondary school graduates for our higher naval schools.

Matters are more complex with regard to the intake of warrant officers. The reasons lie primarily in the lack of reliable social guarantees. And that must be taken into account. The process of staffing the navy with men who want to serve under contract is also proceeding unevenly. At the present stage only 10 percent of our posts will be filled on the basis of this principle. At first glance salaries for servicemen on contract are respectable but in my view they could be larger... We link our hopes for a change in the situation with the practical implementation of the Russian Federation law "on the status of servicemen" and other military laws which the Supreme Soviet adopted recently.

The quality of the draftee contingent is also causing serious concern and much has been said and is being said now about this. But I do not believe that the spirit of romance of naval service has been totally erased from today's young men. For all the importance of the financial and socioconsumer aspects of life they cannot wholly replace the spiritual need to be at sea, to be on a long sea voyage, and to meet with unknown danger. So that the sales of romance, although they have weakened somewhat, have not completely dropped. I think our times will cause them to swell anew. I hope that the Russian public's attention toward naval problems and preparation for the 300th anniversary of the Russian navy will help that.

[Aleksandrov] Then one last question, Feliks Nikolayevich. In your opinion what qualities should be inherent in the people who are serving in the Russian Navy today and those who will serve tomorrow?

[Gromov] Love for the fatherland, devotion to their military and naval duty and their chosen way of life, a high degree of competence and exactingness combined with concern for their subordinates.

Apart from anything else I value decency, honesty, and openness in people. And, of course, a sense of humor... As Admiral Makarov once said, melancholy people are unsuited to the navy...

1981 Submarine Incident Off Sweden

93UM0417A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 1, Jan 93 pp 9-16

[Article by Captain 1st Rank Vyacheslav Kocherov, and Aleksandr Mozgovoy, under the rubric: "Situation": "Long Consequences of a Single Incident"]

[Text]

1. Stockholm Didn't Accept Our Apologies

The incident, when Baltic Fleet Submarine S-363 (hull number 137) ended up aground in a restricted zone of

Swedish territorial waters near Karlskrona Naval Base, occurred on 27 October 1981, that is, more than 11 years ago.

At that time, Moscow offered apologies to Stockholm and the command authorities of our Navy officially stated that the accident was the consequence of the malfunction of a number of navigation systems on the submarine and gross errors in ship handling. However, the Swedes did not accept the explanations despite the fact that all of the required documents were shown to them: the Incident Investigation Report, the Submarine Commander's Directive for the Cruise, the ship's and navigation logs, navigational charts, etc., which quite obviously confirm that its entry into Swedish territorial waters had not been premeditated. Nevertheless, Swedish officials still assert that S-363 deliberately intruded into Gose-Fjord.

Indeed, these official opinions are shared by not nearly all participants of the investigation in Sweden itself. Specifically, former "South" Naval Base at Karlskrona Chief of Staff Commodore Karl Andersson stated in a GETEBORG POSTEN newspaper interview: "The submarine was sailing in the surface condition with its diesel engine operating and that is not nearly how someone who wants to sneak into fjords unnoticed would act." However, an "epidemic of periscope disease" literally swept over the country through the efforts of politicians and representatives of the "Fourth Estate". In connection with this, what Military Journalist V. Myasnikov certainly had the opportunity to observe on a steamship that was sailing to Stockholm revealed enough about this ghastly episode. A small group of young Swedes, who were running from side to side, were breaking off small pieces of chocolate and throwing them into the waters of the fjord. To the question: "What are you doing?"—followed the children's quite serious response: "We are feeding Russian submarines."

To increase tension in society, Sweden's antisubmarine warfare forces began to raise the alarm several times a year and that information was reported in the mass media. And the first large-scale hunt for an unknown submarine in the southern portion of Stockholm's fjords took place in October 1982, exactly one year after our submarine's "unexpected visit".

Eight hundred Swedish and foreign journalists participated in the coverage of the hunt. And although the searches turned out to be unsuccessful, this did not prevent Sweden from publicly lodging an official protest to the USSR that Soviet minisubmarines had allegedly penetrated into its waters. And, six months later, in April 1983, the Committee for Submarines was created which was made up of the then still little known Moderate Coalition Party Figure Carl Bildt. Skillfully taking advantage of the situation, he began to rapidly make his political career in combating unidentified submarines and last year became prime minister. The committee's activities also included a large antisubmarine warfare

show that was organized in February 1984. Here's how a West German DPA Agency correspondent in Stockholm described it:

"For eight weeks, the Swedish armed forces combated the invisible enemy. The alarm was sounded at the naval base at Karlskrona on 10 February, allegedly as a result of the appearance of a submarine. During the hunt for this submarine, two mines weighing 200 kilograms each were detonated, 23 depth charges weighing 100 kg each were dropped from torpedo boats, helicopters combed the search area, dropping 25 bombs weighing 30 kg each, the coast guard threw approximately 50 hand grenades into the Baltic Sea and fired semi-automatic rifles at supposed foreign skindivers, having launched dozens of illumination flares into the sky... The most active employment of weapons by the Swedish military during the last 175 years ended without results... An hour-long magnetic tape recording of submarine equipment noises which should have revealed its nationality turned out to be 'indistinct and unacceptable'. A 10-meter long submarine that was allegedly seen by three fishermen and even the traces of engine oil that were left behind turned out to be the waste discharge pipe of a purification facility. The 'submarine device' that was raised to the surface was, in all probability, a sunken automobile... Minister of Defense Anders Tumborg compared this hunt with the 'pursuit of the Loch Ness monster'.

In the conclusion of this article on the truly royal hunt, it cost approximately 50 million krona (nearly 17 million West German marks), the DPA correspondent arrived at the conclusion that "Its results resulted in sobriety". But he was mistaken because future events demonstrated that sobriety did not arrive and this pattern became increasingly noticeable: recurrences of "periscope disease" were most often manifested when the Riksdag was reviewing the defense budget. As a result, they managed to obtain approximately three billion krona more than the initially planned appropriations. The Elma special antisubmarine warfare system was even developed, the four depth charge racks of which installed on surface combatants were capable of providing a salvo of 32 magnetic antisubmarine grenades in a water area with a diameter of 75 meters. "Having been sucked" to the hull of a submarine, the grenade's shaped charge is capable of making a one-inch hole in the hull of any submarine and to force it to surface. Two hundred forty eight tests of the system were successful. "We conducted tests on underwater targets that were moving at a speed of nine knots and hitting the target and the desired effect were unavoidable," Captain 3rd Rank Bengt Ugglä informed a UPI correspondent in August 1983. Since that time, hundreds of Elmas have rained down on presumed submarines. The result—zero! At that time, British Vice Admiral J. Majioch, who was responsible for antisubmarine defense in Her Majesty's Navy Headquarters and who managed the operations of NATO submarines in the North Atlantic, decided to sort out the situation. He expressed his thoughts on the pages of Stockholm's AFTONBLADET.

"The campaign that was conducted in Sweden with regard to the violation of its territorial waters by submarines is farfetched," stated the admiral. Concerning the October 1981 incident, he said: "No man with common sense believes that they would send a submarine to an area where it cannot submerge... It is totally improbable that submarine No. 137 was there intentionally, carrying out some sort of planned mission... Obviously submarine No. 137 was knocked off course by some sort of malfunction of its gyrocompass and had strayed many hours before it went aground. The fact that the submarine went so deeply into Swedish territorial waters—is purely coincidental."

However, the British admiral did not convince the propagandists of the "malicious penetration" of Soviet submarines into Swedish territorial waters although, except for S-363's inadvertent entry, there haven't been and there can't be a single piece of evidence of their appearance in Swedish waters.

But the incident in October 1981 did in fact occur! So what happened during that ill-fated autumn?

2. Fatal Blunders

We are publishing certain documents associated with this issue because experience has shown that the secrecy of the negotiations does not facilitate understanding the essence of the problem by the societies of both countries.

So, the primary object of this story—is design 613 medium submarine S-363 that was built in Leningrad and that entered the Navy inventory in 1957. From September 1979 through October 1980, it underwent medium-level maintenance. In 1981, it began to be listed as combat capable and, based on the crew's training level, a combat ready boat. This is clear from the investigation report of the circumstances of its running aground in foreign territorial waters on 27 October 1981.

So, although the ship was listed among a number of combat ready ships, it was obviously obsolete, at the limit of the prescribed operating period and was quite unsuitable for the performance of sensitive missions. This was especially true with regard to its navigation systems. The corresponding information indicated that the following navigational systems were installed on S-363: a Kurs-3 gyrocompass that was installed on the submarine in 1956, an LR-5 log in 1957, an NEL-5 depth finder in 1978, an ARP-53 radio direction-finder in 1972, and a GON magnetic compass in 1956.

It is easy to calculate that the boat was built and some of its navigation systems were installed on it before a large part of S-363's crew were born. And this is what the report states about the people who were declared to be primarily at fault for the accident.

Submarine Commander Captain 3rd Rank Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Gushchin was assigned to the position in December 1980. He assumed command of the boat on 20 January 1981. He was cleared to independently

command the design 613 submarine in 1977. The clearance was confirmed in February 1981. He does not have running voyage experience in combat service.

Submarine Navigation Department Commander Senior Lieutenant Anatoliy Ivanovich Korostov was assigned to the position in August 1979. He was cleared for unsupervised operation of the department in March 1981. He does not have running voyage experience in combat service.

The senior on board the submarine—Submarine Brigade Chief of Staff Captain 1st Rank Iosif Fedorovich Avrukevich was cleared for unsupervised operation of a design 613 submarine in 1969. He was assigned to his position in 1976 after completion of the Naval Academy where he left the position of deputy commander of that same brigade.

From these meager lines, it is clear: the submarine's commander and navigator—were hardly "sea wolves" as some attempt to present them, but novices in their posts. That is why Captain 1st Rank Avrukevich was also designated the senior on this cruise.

According to the Baltic Fleet Headquarters directive for this submarine, it was scheduled to put to sea at 18:00 on 16 September and to carry out runs and patrols in areas P-1; P-2¹ in accordance with the scheduled plan. Maintenance between patrols and relaxation of personnel at Svinouystse from 7 through 17 October. Return to base at 08:00 on 5 November. Here, among other things, an order was issued that prohibited the submarine from approaching closer than five miles to foreign states' territorial waters.

According to the investigation report, the events of the concluding phase of the cruise developed as follows. On 17 October at 18:22, the submarine left the port of Svinouystse to continue patrolling in those same areas east of Bornholm Island where it had sailed for 22 days prior to this.

On 18 October at 18:10 at point 55°09' North Latitude and 16°07' East Longitude, the submarine collided with the trawling device of a fishing boat while submerged, as a result of which the radio direction-finding antenna was damaged and its use turned out to be impossible. On that same day, they discovered that the depth finder was operating intermittently. The situation was made even worse by the unreliable operation of the Dekka radar navigation system (RNS) receiver-scope. So, a situation developed on the submarine that did not allow them to ensure safe navigation with full observance of the concealed sailing mode.

Under these conditions, the submarine command authorities decided not to report to the fleet command post about striking the floating obstacle and also about the navigation instruments going out of order, however, it also did not take the additional navigation steps that would have provided knowledge of the submarine's location with the accuracy that is required to carry out


the mission in the assigned area and for safe navigation. On the contrary, here an increase of the size of the error in the knowledge of the navigation location occurred, which in all times has resulted in navigation accidents and even to catastrophes, due to a lack of concern and violation of the elementary requirements of ship navigation.

As a result of the reasons that were listed above, on 20 October the divergence between the submarine's actual and calculated locations was 13.5 miles on a heading of 124° and on 21 October had reached 29.5 miles on a heading of 100°. During the course of 22-24 October the submarine sailed with the current location errors that had been accumulated in the preceding days. On 25

October, they attempted to determine their location using the stars in the morning twilight but, due to the improper preparation of the sextant they obtained large errors in measurement which did not permit them to totally resolve the astronomical problem. In the future, attempts were not undertaken to determine the location using astronomical techniques.

On 26 October, with the next erroneous determination of the submarine's location using the Dekka RNS, they obtained a discrepancy on a heading of 164° with a size of 8.5 miles and, without any analysis whatsoever, they displaced the submarine's calculated location by the amount of the discrepancy, being guided by the principle: "consider yourself to be closer to danger", in this

Submarine Hull Number 137's Maneuvering From 00:00 hours on 25 October 1981 Until It Ran Aground



Key:

- | | |
|---------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. Sweden. | 9. Hanöbukten Bay |
| 2. Karlshamn. | 10. Swedish Territorial Waters. |
| 3. Karlskrona. | 11. Baltic Sea. |
| 4. Kalmar Strait. | 12. Cape Hammeren. |
| 5. Oland Island. | 13. Bornholm Island. |
| 6. Hanö Island. | 14. Ronne. |
| 7. Sanda. | 15. Nekso. |
| 8. Utlängen Island. | 16. Cape Dueodde. |

case—to the bank of the Slupsk than the size of the divergence between the actual and calculated locations up to 45 miles on a heading of 154°.

On 27 October, the chief of staff decided to approach within sight of Bornholm Island's lighthouses to precisely ascertain the location. Not having detected the lighthouse lights visually due to poor visibility, they didn't use the radar, guided by concerns for concealment. Later, based on the chief of staff's decision, the submarine submerged to the bottom, thus determining the sea depth—51 meters. As a result of the random concurrence of the measured depth with its value at the new erroneous location that was obtained using the Dekka RNS to the south of what had been calculated, they decided to accept a calculation discrepancy of 14.5 miles on a heading of 191°. This decision was totally groundless because the simplest analysis indicated that in this case the preceding sailing of the submarine should have occurred in areas with depths that were less than the depths of its navigation. As a result of these actions, the difference between the actual and calculated locations reached 53.8 miles on a heading of 160°.

To avoid the presumed threat—the bank of the Slupsk—the submarine began to move to the North. At 19:30, they detected the white light of Utklippan Lighthouse through the periscope which did not diverge in its specifications and was accepted as a fishing boat's light and they began to go around it to the left. With the approach of darkness, at 20:09 the submarine surfaced to recharge its battery while continuing to move away from the fishing boats. At 21:22, the search station detected the operation of a radar in the 5-centimeter band dead ahead and they visually detected lights to the right along the course. They thought that the radar belonged to an FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] destroyer and the lights belonged to fishing boats (they had actually detected the operation of a Swedish coastal radar and the lights of villages on the islands).

At 21:38, they detected a dark spot with a diameter of 150 meters ahead and to the left 200 meters and they took it to be an oil slick. This was actually Danaflet Island, the height of which is from 0.5 to 1.5 meters. The commander shut down the diesel and invited the brigade chief of staff to the bridge and proposed submerging to avoid the destroyer. The chief of staff did not approve the suggestion and ordered him to continue to charge the battery and to turn to the left to move away from the German ship.

Immediately after that, the dark spots of the islands were detected on the water and were also taken to be oil slicks and the submarine at 21:50, being propelled by one diesel, set out on a course of 30° to pass between them. At 21:52, they passed 40 meters from Flangsher Island and, in the process, the signalman observed breakers which he took to be sludge but the commander did not react to his report.

At 21:55, the commander adjusted the submarine's course 10° to the left in order to once again pass between "oil slicks" and, at 21:57, while following a course of 20° at a speed of 8 knots, submarine S-363 went aground on the coastal shoals of Turumsher Island at point 56°04' north latitude and 15°44' east longitude. The submarine's actual location from the calculated location was 56.3 miles on a heading of 343°.

All of the data cited here have been taken from the investigation report which a board of experts of 14 admirals and senior naval officers conducted, having painstakingly studied and analyzed a multitude of documents associated with this scandalous accident.


3. Bertil Sturkshe's "Catch" and its Consequences

The chain of events in those October 1981 days in Gose-Fjord initially reminded us of the theme of the Hollywood comedy film "The Russians Are Coming". As in the film, a fisherman and not the military detected the submarine that had run aground. In real life, he turned out to be Bertil Sturkshe, who had set out in the morning to inspect the nets that he had set out in Gose Fjord since evening. His "catch" exceeded all of his expectations. Sturkshe hastily returned home and called the naval base located nearby and informed them about his find. The Swedish seamen were no less disheartened than our seamen... However, their official authorities preferred another variation of the future development of events, having taken as a foundation the apocalyptic American film "The Next Day".

Stockholm immediately put forward four conditions to the Government of the USSR: The Soviet Union was obligated to offer official apologies, the Swedes themselves would refloat the submarine and would receive appropriate compensation for that, and they would also be authorized to interrogate the commander of the Soviet submarine. Agreement was rapidly achieved on the first three points. But initially, Gushchin categorically refused to give testimony. And he was sent on a boat to Karlskrona for a conversation only on 2 November, although prior to that he had met with Karl Andersson and acquainted him with the ship's documents and navigation equipment on board the S-363.

All of the participants of this accident certainly experienced a strong psychological shock at that time. You can't envy either the submarine commander, the navigator, nor especially the senior on board, and certainly no one from the crew. When I managed to meet with A. Gushchin at Paldiski at the end of 1991, where he was serving in a coastal subunit, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich, having listened to the question about the accident at Gose-Fjord, paled and a mask of pain hardened on his face. "I have reported everything in written and oral form to the members of the investigation board. And I can't add anything new," he snapped. However, a month

Submarine Hull Number 137's Maneuvering When It Ran Aground on 27 October 1981



Key:

1. The Sturøen Islands.
2. Meteorological Conditions:—Still,—Low Swell,—Low Haze,—Drizzle.
3. Visibility:—near the water:—approximately 1-3 kb [cable lengths] (200-600 meters); at an altitude of more than 15-20 meters—full. Height of the islands: Danaflét, Bekesher, Flagsher, Turumsher:—from 0.5 to 1.2 meters,—Uninhabited Islands.
4. 3 kb (approximately 600 meters) [unintelligible] visibility near the water.
5. Took Course 65°, 7-8 knots under diesel power.
6. The radar operator's report: "Detected the operation of a radar in the 5 cm. band ahead along the bow". Watch officer's report: "We are observing lights to the right and we are identifying them as a concentration fishing boat lights". (The lights were actually on the shore)
7. The duty radar operator's report: "The radar cannot be identified." OSNAZ [not found] Officer's order: "Identify the target".
8. OSNAZ officer's report to the Bridge: "The target is an FRG destroyer".
9. Watch signalman's and watch officer's report: "To the left 70° there is a dark hole". The submarine commander determined it to be an "oil" slick. The diesel engine was shut down. The commander summoned the brigade chief of staff to the bridge and suggested that they submerge to avoid the destroyer.
10. The brigade chief of staff observed and ordered: 1. Continue to charge the batteries. 2. Do not submerge to avoid the destroyer. 3. Evade the destroyer to the right. 4. Having caught sight of an island 50° to the left, he took it to be that same oil slick and issued an order to avoid the slick.
11. Having detected an oil slick to the left off the bow, the submarine commander decided to pass between the slicks.
12. Signalman's report: "There is a breakwater to the left off the side at a distance of 20-30 meters". The watch officer: "There can't be any breakwaters here".
13. Turn to a course of 20° to pass between the "oil slicks".
14. Espesher Island.
15. Turumsher Island.
16. Flagsher Island.
17. Bekesher Island.
18. Lake Danaflét

and a half later, in January 1992, A. Gushchin spoke on Swedish Television Channel 3 on the program of the popular Swedish Host R. Ashberg and told the astonished Swedes that he had an order to prepare the submarine to be blown up in the event of an attempt to seize it. By the way, S-363 Former Deputy Commander for Political Affairs Vasilii Besedin had previously reported that in an interview in AFTONBLADET newspaper.

"I can responsibly say: there was no order to prepare the submarine to be blown up," Reserve Captain 1st Rank Boris Petrovich Shkanov, who was responsible for all types of communications with submarine S-363 in October 1981, told me. "And there was no need to issue it. All provisions for such cases have been written in Navy Regulations. The commander assumed personal liability for their precise fulfillment."

But, be that as it may, matters did not reach tragic extremes and after carrying out all of Stockholm's demands, they refloated the submarine and kicked it out of Swedish territorial waters. But, as we have already become convinced, the incident was not settled at that... The fact is that the Swedes continued to assert that foreign submarines regularly penetrate into their territorial waters and made us to understand that they first and foremost suspect us. Of course, we denied that and in turn asserted that this was being done to incite anti-Soviet passions in the country and in the world. And suddenly this ridiculous accident. It's understandable that the Swedes ascribed to our account each subsequent more or less suspicious incident that was recorded by their appropriate services. Yes and when they did not ascribe them, it was inevitably associated with the Soviet Union in the public consciousness because they wouldn't permit the memory of our unlucky submariners to die down.

We have already discussed the results of the search for our hypothetical submarines in 1983 and 1984. But twice: in September 1988 and in February 1990, submarines—but of the German Navy—actually penetrated into Swedish territorial waters and were forced to surface. The FRG embassy in Stockholm explained the latest incident when submarine V-13 penetrated Swedish territorial waters in the area of Simrishamn as "a navigation equipment malfunction" and offered its government's apologies. And these apologies were immediately accepted.

Finally, the prolonged incitement of tension surrounding the allegedly systematic violations of the state's maritime borders by foreign submarines resulted in the demand by the opposition Swedish Social-Democratic Party to create an independent commission to investigate all of these cases. However, Carl Bildt's government is preventing that, having announced that this commission cannot begin its work until Swedish-Russian negotiations at the level of experts have been concluded on this subject.

And not long before that, in October 1991, USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Relations Yu. Deryabin requested that then Minister of Defense Marshal of

Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov "be charged to conduct an inspection of archival and other materials in order to establish the truth in the matter of our submarines entering Swedish waters. A frank discussion with the Swedes about how the matter actually stood could only increase the prestige of our politicians and of our state".

On 19 November, Admiral of the Fleet I. Kapitanets reported to Ye. Shaposhnikov: "After that incident (October 1981—the Author), a series of measures that preclude such incidents were conducted in the Navy. So, our submarines have been prohibited from approaching closer than 50 km to the external border of Swedish territorial waters and closer than 14.5 km in the area of Gotland Island... The Baltic Fleet commander has advanced a proposal to conduct an official meeting with the commander of the Swedish Navy to achieve a mutual understanding on this issue. However, our proposal has remained without attention... In connection with what has been set forth, I would consider it advisable to inform the USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] on the immutability of our position and on the far-fetched and unsubstantiated nature of the claims on the violation of Swedish territorial waters by Soviet submarines and on the readiness of the Soviet side to conduct joint consultations at the level of experts on the resolution of this issue."

On 6 December 1991, Mr. Yu. Deryabin met with Swedish Ambassador to the USSR E. Berner and informed him of USSR's readiness to conduct joint consultations at the level of experts with the Swedish side on this problem.

4. The Swedes's Arguments Are Not Convincing. Their Accusations Are Unsubstantiated

The first working meeting of CIS Navy and Swedish Navy experts occurred on 28-29 January 1992 in Moscow. Advisor to Prime Minister Bildt for Naval Issues Commodore E. Svensson headed the Swedish side and Navy Main Staff Operations Directorate Representative Captain 1st Rank V. Vazhov headed our side.

After the first round of negotiations, Admiral of the Fleet K. Makarov informed Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2nd European Department Chief Yu. Fokin:

"In accordance with the preliminary agreement, the events of the first half of 1988 when Swedish antisubmarine warfare surveillance systems allegedly detected underwater objects in the fjords of Stockholm Archipelago and antisubmarine warfare ships attacked the detected objects must be examined at the meeting. Although the attacks were unsuccessful, the Swedes have nevertheless classified these targets as small submarines that belong to the USSR Navy."

However, with the initiation of the work Swedish experts attempted to conduct a discussion on the problem of violations of their territorial waters as a whole during the period from the end of the Second World War until today, while primarily relying on the position of C.

Bildt's well-known report to the Riksdag in January 1991 and ascribing all the cases of "violations" of territorial waters to Soviet submarines, including the issue concerning USSR Navy submarine no. 137 that ran aground in the area of Karlskrona in 1981. The Swedes think that this irrefutably proves the continuous activity of Soviet submarines in the Swedish fjords. This assertion in no way corresponds to reality. Nevertheless, they define this as a key issue in the process of improving relations between Sweden and Russia and persistently strive to convince us to admit the premeditation of the actions of that submarine and so far do not recognize any arguments that refute their version...

During the discussion of the 1981 events after the presentation of documentary data on the composition of Baltic Fleet submarine forces and of all of their activities in the first six months of 1988 by our team, the Swedes were compelled to admit that Baltic Fleet submarines, based upon their tactical-technical specifications, did not participate and could not have participated in "operations" in the fjord areas of Stockholm Archipelago in the first half of 1988. Nevertheless, they continued to assert that, since the Soviet Union's technological capabilities permit it to develop special low displacement submarines, they could have been developed and, consequently, they could have participated in these operations...

The Swedes were acquainted with the specifications of the two Baltic Fleet small displacement submarine devices that are designed to conduct search and rescue measures, studies of the sea bottom and are capable, if necessary, of laying mines. In the process, it was stressed that the first device completed testing and was accepted from industry only in December 1988 and the second in 1990 and, based upon their specifications (cruising range, endurance, and seaworthiness), these devices cannot operate in the fjord areas... However, we still haven't managed to finally convince the Swedes of the absence of plans in the Navy to conduct any sort of special operations whatsoever in Sweden's territorial waters and fjords, including using special small, in size and displacement, submarines. They think (referring to G. Burbulis' statement during the period of his visit to Sweden) that Russia's ever increasing openness [otkrytost] must lead us to the admission of the prolonged, systematic activity of Baltic Sea Fleet submarines in Swedish territorial waters. In the process, they directly raised the issue that, if we admit the premeditated nature of the activities of submarine no. 137 in 1981, this will substantially improve relations between Sweden and Russia...

We must note that Swedish experts practically did not present any convincing documents whatsoever that confirm their version and restricted themselves to two declaratory statements of a general nature and to the showing of a video film that also did not permit us to arrive at any specific conclusions whatsoever on the nature of the detected objects and, all the more so, on their nationality and that was also pointed out to them...

It is advisable to continue the discussion on the entire problem to finally remove suspicion from our Navy in the conduct of special "operations" against the Swedish coast.

The second meeting of experts occurred in April 1991, also in Moscow. Based on its results, Navy Commander Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin reported to CIS Unified Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Ye. Shaposhnikov: "...The primary issue that was examined at this meeting was the incident associated with the grounding of submarine S-363 in the area of the Sweden's Karlskrona Naval Base.

"The archival documents that were submitted to the Swedish side on the whole allowed us to prove the unpremeditated nature of the submarine's activities however, Swedish Navy representatives, while partially admitting the truth of our statements, are attempting to delay the adoption of a final conclusion. It is obvious that this is associated with the aspiration to maintain for as long as possible the awareness of the truth of their 'theory' in public opinion or with the need for the search for a suitable solution for them to the situation that has developed.

"The Swedish side has proposed the organization of the next meeting for a more detailed examination of the originals of the documents that describe the cruise of submarine S-363 (the submarine's navigational and ship's logs). They proposed conducting the meeting in Stockholm in approximately the first half of June 1992 where they intend to present materials of their own investigation of this accident and already at that meeting arrive at an agreed finding on the incident with submarine S-363.

"In our opinion, the proposal of the Swedish side will not lead to a final solution of the issue. Demands for the presentation of additional originals of the logs will result in a simple extension of time. All of these logs were presented to the Swedish side in 1981 during the accident investigation at Karlskrona Naval Base".

At the end of June, Captain 1st Rank V. Vazhov and a team of specialists traveled to Stockholm. V. Chernavin reported to Russian Federation Minister of Defense P. Grachev on the results of the meeting: "In accordance with the Russian Federation President's 11 April 1992 Directive No. 171-rp, the third meeting of Russian Federation Navy and Swedish Navy experts took place during the period of 25-26 June 1992 in Stockholm during the course of which analysis continued of the circumstances that are associated with the grounding of Baltic Fleet submarine S-363 in Swedish territorial waters in 1981...

"During the course of the meeting, the Swedish side obtained the opportunity to become acquainted with the documents of that period that confirm the unpremeditated nature of the activity of our submarine. However, the Swedes continue to assert that the incident is being explained 'with a high degree of probability' not by navigational errors but by the submarine's premeditated activities.

"The Swedish side advocated cessation of the discussion of this incident which actually signifies preservation of the situation that has developed surrounding the events of 1981. Meanwhile, it was proposed that we continue the work of experts of the two countries on the problem: 'Foreign submarines in Swedish territorial waters'.

"In our opinion, Sweden's current government and Navy leadership are interested in maintaining "afloat" the problems of the violation of Swedish territorial waters, while associating with this the preservation of their own political positions and also the plans for future financing of the Navy.

"While considering what has been set forth above, I propose:

"Continue work with the Swedish side, while being guided by the Russian Federation President's assignment. During the course of the discussion of the incident with submarine S-363, proceed from the fact that it was formally settled in 1981 when the Government of the USSR offered official apologies to the Swedish Government and paid monetary compensation. Our readiness to provide additional explanations was caused only by good will and a desire to remove an obstacle to the development of full-fledged bilateral relations..."

Having agreed with V. Chernavin's conclusions, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Colonel-General V. Dubynin noted in a report to P. Grachev: "In our opinion, our readiness for these types of meetings promotes the cessation of the propagandistic hullabaloo surrounding this problem and elimination of the element of suspicion in bilateral relations and would meet the Russian Federation's interests. Meanwhile, while manifesting good will, we must not permit a slide to a position of continuously trying to prove our innocence".

5. The Political Campaign Continues

Yes, the Russian side has an adequate reserve of good will which, unfortunately, it is impossible to say about our partners in the dialog. After the second round of negotiations, DAGENS NUHETER newspaper correspondents asked the Prime Minister's Advisor for Foreign Affairs Junas Hafstrom: "Are you convinced that the Soviet Union lied with regard to the submarines?"—"Yes, we are convinced of that," the response followed. And on the eve of the third rendezvous of experts, Swedish Defense Minister Anders Björck, without producing any evidence, accused the Russian seamen of continuing the practice of entering the fjords. The next meeting of specialists that was planned for September was postponed at Stockholm's insistence.

At that time, it turned out that the Swedish authorities had other plans: an unprecedented battle developed to terminate "foreign submarine activity" in the waters adjacent to the city of Okselesund. On 13 September, the Corvette Heteborg attacked an unidentified submarine with the latest Italian-manufactured acoustic torpedo near Gustav Dahlen Lighthouse. The torpedo did not

destroy the target. On 16 September, Swedish Navy ships dropped dozens of depth charges on an underwater violator. And everything without result. The failure, in the words of Coastal Fleet Commander Rear Admiral Sten Svedlund, was explained by "the unlevel nature of the sea bottom".

On 22 September, Prime Minister C. Bildt himself came to Okselesund. He personally conducted the hunt for three hours. By the way, his presence did not yield anything new. The operation did not produce results. However, that did not prevent the cabinet head from casting the accusation: "Our suspicions, in and of themselves, are directed against Russia". The next day the prime minister said that the mass media had distorted his statement. But we know that words are not birds—out you let them, and back you never get them!... Journalists recorded the prime minister's words on tape recorders. It is clear from the recordings that it was Russia that Bildt indicated as the country—violation of territorial waters.

A high-ranking Swedish Ministry of Defense bureaucrat attempted to excuse the prime minister by pointing to his "emotional nature": "That could be an outburst of everything that he learned about the hunt for submarines that was taking place or a reaction to the negotiations on the submarine problem which are being conducted right now with Russia".

But it's not clear what this has to do with negotiations with Russia. But from the "outburst" came circles. Right after the prime minister, Swedish Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief General Bengt Gustafsson flabbergasted the public. He took an even more abrupt approach—he advanced an "initiative" on which not even the military departments of the United States and the other NATO countries have so far decided. The general proposed to former and currently serving Russian Navy officers that they sell information to Stockholm for hard currency on "mini-submarine basing locations" and "their missions," that is, engage in spy activity against their own country. Conduct of the operation is assigned to the so-called Office of Special Information—the Swedish Secret Service.

As a result of these unprecedented statements by high-ranking Swedish officials, Navy Chief Navigator Rear Admiral V. Aleksin commented on the situation as follows: "Only two Baltic Sea submarines had put to sea when the Swedish Navy was conducting its hunt in the area of Okselesund. On 10-11 September, a Foxtrot Class submarine (based upon the classification accepted in the West) commanded by Captain 2nd Rank V. Slyushchenko was rehearsing combat training missions at the edge of our territorial waters in the area of Baltiysk. On 14-15 September, it completed a surface run to the port of Liyepaya. The other submarine, a Juliet Class under the command of Captain 2nd Rank O. Lyakin, carried out a run from Liyepaya to Baltiysk on 21-22 September. On 23 September, it carried out a practice dive at a combat training range a distance of 20

miles from the Russian coast. Later, while surfaced, it took a course for base where it arrived on 25 September... The accuracy of determining positions was no worse than one mile. Since the Baltic Sea is 180 miles wide in that area, assertions of the violation of Swedish territorial waters by Russian submarines is absurd and does not have any basis whatsoever."

"Carl Bildt's participation in the searches for the mythical submarines once again proves that the Swedish authorities are imparting first and foremost political significance to the 'periscope problem'. In any case, guidance of naval operations by the prime minister personally causes, putting it mildly, bewilderment among specialists."

The political significance of Bildt's statements is obvious. The opposition is subjecting the cabinet's activities to severe criticism. That is why they needed to divert the attention of the Swedes from these problems. Furthermore, B. Gustafsson just announced the military structural development five-year plan which asserts that Swedish defense allegedly "suffers substantial flaws" and, specifically, it states that the capabilities of the antisubmarine warfare forces are "limited". Isn't that why the hunt for the mythical submarines was begun and why they named Moscow as the malefactor based upon the old habit? One of the ardent advocates of continuing the searches for "Russian submarines" Vilhelm Agrell quite frankly substantiated the current position of the Bildt Cabinet: "While the Soviet Union existed, no Swedish prime minister could talk about the incidents in open text. But right now there is nothing special to fear. Today the reaction of the Russians has substantially less significance for Sweden..."

And Mr. Agrell has turned out to be correct. No demarches whatsoever have followed from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Moscow, it's as if they haven't noticed Bildt's insulting statements and Gustafsson's instigating "proposals". But it's still not too late to correct the situation. In our opinion, contacts at the level of naval experts must be suspended until the Swedish prime minister and commander-in-chief publicly offer official apologies to Russia for their tactless statements.

As we have already stated, the Swedish Social Democrats are demanding the creation of an independent commission with the involvement of parliamentarians to study the bother surrounding alien submarines in Swedish waters. We think that a joint Russian-Swedish Parliamentary Commission could rapidly dot the "i".

Footnotes

1. The patrol areas (Latitude-North, Longitude-East):
P-1—Lat-55°20', Long-16°43', Lat-55°13', Long-16°49',
Lat-54°51', Long-15°33', Lat-54°58', Long-15°27'.

P-2—Lat-55°21', Long-16°53', Lat-55°14', Long-16°50',
Lat-55°22', Long-15°29', Lat-55°29', Long-15°32'.

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Barents Sea Sub Mishap, U.S. Apology Noted
93UM0474A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Mar 93 p 7

[Article by Aleksandr Mozgovoy: "For the Time Being, All We Hear Are 'Regrets'"]

[Text] As has already been reported, on 20 March a Northern Fleet nuclear-powered submarine collided with an American submarine in the Barents Sea beyond Russia's territorial waters. A ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent managed to learn a few details of the incident at the Main Staff of the Navy.

A Russian nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarine commanded by Captain 1st Rank A. Bulgakov was practicing training missions in a combat training area 120 miles northeast of the entrance to the Kola Gulf. It was being tracked by an unknown foreign submarine (its nationality was not determined at that time). Our submarine was at a depth of 74 meters; the other a little above that, trying to keep in the acoustical "shadow" zone. But then the commander of the foreign submarine, apparently, lost sonar contact with our nuclear-powered submarine, and began to maneuver dangerously in search of the target. That is what led to the accident.

A. Bulgakov's nuclear-powered submarine received minor damage in the forebody. The people, the nuclear propulsion plant, and the weapons systems were unaffected. The submarine returned to base. Its sonar operators recorded noises of the foreign submarine. Parts of the foreign submarine's outer plating made an "imprint" in the hull of the missile-carrying submarine during the collision. In the opinion of naval experts, these "fingerprints" made it possible to determine the nationality of the ship that cut into the Russian vessel.

But an expert examination was not required. The U.S. Department of Defense admitted that an American submarine had collided with the Russian nuclear-powered submarine. The United States expressed "regrets" over the incident.

We would remind you that this is not the first submarine collision off our shores. Ten such incidents have occurred in combat training ranges of the Northern and Pacific Fleets in the last 25 years. On 11 February of last year, while surfacing in its territorial waters at the entrance to the Kola Gulf, a Russian nuclear-powered submarine commanded by Captain 2d Rank I. Lokt collided with the American nuclear-powered vessel Baton Rouge.

Meanwhile, each of these incidents is fraught with dangerous consequences. The submarines and crews could perish as a result of the collisions, and the damage to the nuclear power plants and weapons threaten ecological disasters.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Gen Dudnik: Army Should Avoid Localized, UN Operations

MK1103133493 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 11, 14 Mar 93 p A9

[Article by military observer General Vladimir Dudnik under "Opinion" rubric: "Dangerous Security"]

[Text] So, a new cause has been found for Russia's Army. The 201st Motorized Rifle Division, retaining its "international composition," has been left in Tajikistan as a peacekeeping force. A battalion of CIS "peacekeeping forces" (whose nature and mandate are unknown to anybody) has been brought in to help it, and battalions from the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan are on their way. Simultaneously President Yeltsin has called on international organizations, including the United Nations, to give Russia special powers as the guarantor of peace and stability on the former USSR's territory.

This could create a new military-political situation in this area. It is difficult enough as it is.

Should we, bearing this in mind, interfere in conflicts and regional wars on the former USSR's territory, even if they threaten Russia's security?

The idea of using the Russian Army as a peacekeeping force can be approved in principle. Our attempt, however, to act as a third, neutral, force in the Dniester Region, the Ossetian-Ingush conflict, and Tajikistan is voluntarily or involuntarily turning into preferential support for one of the warring sides.

It is known that UN peacekeeping forces are always neutral in a conflict. Operating on the basis of an established mechanism and an international mandate, they carry out operations only after the conflicting sides agree to a cease-fire. If firing flares up again, as a rule these operations cease.

On CIS territory the Russian Army is being used to achieve a cease-fire even before there is a reconciliation between the sides.

By January 1992 around 5.5 million people had taken part in UN operations. Eight hundred officers and soldiers from 43 countries had died. The Russian Army's losses resulting from its brief but intensive participation in post-Soviet conflicts run into thousands.

Contingents of UN peacekeeping forces are formed from specially selected and trained people. In localized conflicts they are professionals. Our people are operating not according to a mandate but "according to the situation." In doing so they end up outside civil authorities' control. Like, for example, the 14th Army in the Dniester region.

Thus, Russia has neither the experience, nor the trained forces, nor the mandate, nor the legal mechanism to carry out peacekeeping operations. In these conditions

they will show only Russia's inability to ensure security in the sphere of its immediate interests. This will cause irreparable harm to its international authority.

The conclusion is obvious. For the time being we can defend our interests in nearby foreign countries' "hot spots" only by political and economic methods. Force is no good. It is dangerous for us ourselves.

UKRAINE

Officers' Union Chief Omelchenko Interviewed

93UM0454A Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 30 Jan 93 p 5

[Interview with Officers' Union of Ukraine [SOU] head Hryhoriy Omelyanovych Omelchenko by Oleh Oliynyk under the rubric "Building the Armed Forces": "There Are Declarations. What Will the Resolutions Be?—Who Is Seeking The Dismissal of the Minister of Defense, and Why"]

[Text] *The armed forces do not remain a self-contained structure, a thing unto themselves, even in stable nations. Both politicians and ordinary taxpayers have an interest in who is holding the weapons and at whom they are pointed. The old joking desire that the army be like an old maid, always ready and not needed by anyone, is no more than grounds for amusement nonetheless.*

In our Ukraine, where the nation-building processes are turbulent and equivocal, the army finds itself all the more intertwined with the interests of many forces: radicals and moderates, supporters of various unions and village landholders, non-Ukrainians who are serving in Ukraine and Ukrainian officers of the CIS.

The declaration of 155 deputies of the Supreme Soviet with the demand to dismiss Colonel-General K. Morozov from the post of Minister of Defense was oil thrown on the fire of passions. Among the accusations that were directed toward him in particular was pandering to the activity of the Officers' Union of Ukraine. That, in the opinion of the authors of the declaration, is a politicized organization and is foisting its own will on the resolution of the problems of military organizational development.

A correspondent from URYADOVYY KURYER met with the head of the SOU, H. Omelchenko, a colonel and head of the department to fight organized crime in military counter-intelligence in the Security Service of Ukraine.

[Omelchenko] If the SOU was really a political organization, we would have to re-register. It was registered on 24 Dec 92 by the Ministry of Justice as a civil organization. I would remind you that the work of the SOU, in accordance with the charter, is the submission of proposals to the Supreme Soviet in the sphere of the organizational development of the armed forces, the rendering of assistance to the Ministry of Defense, with its consent, in the preparation of draft military regulations and other standard documents and the submission

of proposals and recommendations pertaining to improving military discipline, combat readiness and the manpower acquisition for the troops. The size of the SOU is almost 15,000 people.

[Oliylyk] Minister K. Morozov is a member of the SOU?

[Omelchenko] No, although at our request he takes part in the work of SOU congresses and its executive bodies. I emphasize that we also enlist other executives from agencies and people's deputies who are interested in seeing that the armed forces of Ukraine are created through joint efforts. That stance is a defining one for us.

[Oliylyk] Hryhoriy Omelyanovych, you are part of the Higher Certification Commission of the Ministry of Defense. By what criteria are personnel moves made there, and do they really demand there that you all but swear to fight against the "main enemy—Russia," as the 155 authors of the declaration write?

[Omelchenko] Any people's deputy of Ukraine has the right to participate in the work of that commission. The commission makes its decisions on the basis of a comprehensive study of the moral and business qualities of candidates for a post. I can state with all authority that there is no pressure on the people on the commission, and assertions of making Russia the face of the enemy are lies. One needs to have some rudimentary decency, not to mention officer's honor, so as to foresee the consequences of such things. Their authors could be subject to legal liability for such baseless fabrications, or more precisely slander.

[Oliylyk] Why, anyway, in your opinion, did the declaration of the 155 appear, since it is mentioned there that "the situation in the armed forces is becoming more and more tense and unsafe for society"? Does that correspond to reality, or is it all just an attempt to traffic in the difficulties?

[Omelchenko] Let's call things by their true names. I declared publicly as early as the summer of last year that an operation had been launched against Minister of Defense K. Morozov to drive him from his position through discrediting. That decision was made by certain political and military forces in Russia, and in particular in the command of the Combined Armed Forces of the CIS. It is not hard to guess why. Minister K. Morozov had taken a clear-cut and unequivocal state stand pertaining to the creation of the armed forces of Ukraine and their non-participation in the military structures of the CIS. So first there were attempts to involve K. Morozov in some mercenary ties—he was offered a foreign-made automobile as a gift by commercial structures, there were insinuations of his luxurious dacha... It did not work. The minister of defense, along with the SOU, instead launched an uncompromising fight against corruption and official abuses in the army. He issued Order No. 110, "Measures to Eradicate Abuses of Official Position by Officials in the Armed Forces of Ukraine," on 24 Jun 92. There are not enough pages in your newspaper to list the violators of various ranks—

from generals to warrant officers—that have been dismissed from the armed forces under that order. Many of them were arrested using our materials and are being subjected to criminal liability.

So that order created a standard base for fighting official abuses and criminal structures in our army. The Supreme Soviet, by the way, as you know, has now passed a law to fight corruption and organized crime, but it does not even have any legal definition of those types of crimes. I would note that this order was first hushed up, and its text was difficult to find. The SOU for its part published five thousand copies of the minister's order, and actually distributed them to all garrisons.

Here are a few examples of the effectiveness of the fight that has been launched by K. Morozov. I quote several of his orders issued according to the results of audits:

"It has been established that the chief of a military plant, Colonel V. Mazin, willfully and at his own discretion used foreign currency that had come in for equipment sold instead of transferring that currency to a special account of the Financial Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, and that the chief of the plant concluded a contract with the firm of Progres for the execution of currency operations for which the firm paid more than 700,000 U.S. dollars. Colonel V. Mazin moreover began to sell currency in August of 1992. Some 1,400,000 dollars were sold to the West Ukrainian Commercial Bank in the city of Lviv and the EKSIMBANK in the city of Kiev alone."

"As the result of an audit of military supply in the city of Kiev, violations were established in the sale of matériel by the logistical service of the KVO [Kiev Military District] and the Logistical Directorate of the Ministry of Defense Rear Services. The losses to the state were a total of more than seven million karbovantsi (in prices as of the beginning of 1992). The sale of property was organized by the chief of the matériel service of the KVO, Colonel M. Trofymenko, deputy chief Colonel N. Alekseyev, chief of military supply Lieutenant-Colonel V. Berezhnovyy, deputy chief Major S. Ivanov and civilian employee V. Pogrebnyak in gross violation of the corresponding legislation."

"The chief of the motor-vehicle service of the OdVO [Odessa Military District], Colonel Yu. Sorokin, along with deputy commanding general of the district for rear services Lieutenant-General V. Bilokhvost, deputy commander for armaments Major-General N. Lobanov, chief of the personnel directorate Major-General A. Maltsev and chief of the medical service A. Brynzoy, illegally sold motor vehicles to various civil organizations and individuals at residual value and without the participation of the commercial center of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, causing losses to the state in an amount of more than five million karbovantsi."

"As of 2 Jan 92 and with the knowledge of the chief of the trade directorate of the OdVO, Colonel V. Petrov, a revaluation of the remaining carryover value of eleven

passenger cars had not been performed, and they were sold at the old prices from 3 through 9 Jan 92. The amount of material losses in the amount of 300,000 karbovantsi were reimbursed on 24 Sep 92." Various scarce goods and products were sold at the instructions of Petrov from trading points in circumvention of the stipulated procedure. V. Petrov was dismissed from his post by order of the minister on 28 Dec 92, but a telegram soon came in from the command of the OdVO requesting that he remain in his post.

I have already related more than once in the mass media the numerous abuses of the chief of Viysktorg [Military Trade] in the city of Bila Tserkva, V. Zhgyl'ovoy. It has been established that losses have been caused to the state of more than 13 million karbovantsi. Some officials from the Ministry of Defense, however, came to the defense of Zhgyl'ovoy. They even "pushed" their son for the position of chief of the department of foreign economic ties of the Rear Services Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. The certification commission was against it, so he was "just" named deputy chief of the department.

I would also point out that many of the generals from the apparatus of the former Kiev Military District who had been found guilty of abuses did not receive posts at the ministry, although they were counting on it. There are inquiries at the ministry today from people's deputies of Ukraine that proposed that the corrupt generals not be dismissed from the armed forces.

There were 1,621 deputies' inquiries overall in the past year with requests for designations or dismissals, transfers or the awarding of ranks. One of the initiators of the declaration of the 155 alone, Colonel V. Izmalkov, sent 55 inquiries. Of course, by law a people's deputy has the right to make an inquiry to any office, but the resolution of personnel issues is the prerogative of the head of an agency or organization. Such attempts are observed quite clearly, and we even have grounds to talk about deputy rather than party patronage.

Now as for Izmalkov. Minister K. Morozov was sent a letter signed by 46 people's deputies in May of 1992 with the request to confer the rank of colonel on V. Izmalkov ahead of schedule; he, they said, had shown himself to be "a supporter of democracy and the ideas of the flourishing of the nation and the emergence of our Ukrainian army." He had received the prior rank of lieutenant colonel in August of 1989, and the position he occupied before being elected a people's deputy was chief of the political department of a brigade. These circumstances did not provide valid grounds for the early conferring of the new rank, the more so even a step higher. The minister withstood the siege of the deputies for several months, and wrote a report to the head of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine until, finally, he had to confer the rank. Virtually all of those who signed the letter on Izmalkov also signed the declaration for the dismissal of the minister of defense.

[Oliynyk] So "disturbances" are also being observed in personnel changes.

[Omelchenko] Its authors actually wrote, "For what reasons were the recently designated commanding general of the Carpathian Military District, Lieutenant-General V. Stepanov, and a number of other officers dismissed?" I have already presented you with examples pertaining to the officers, and the former commanding general was dismissed by an Edict of the President of Ukraine and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of 25 Sep 92 for irresponsibility and loss of control over the non-proliferation of arms. Some of the officers in that military district were also dismissed for serious shortcomings in matters of the physical care of weapons and ammunition; the procuracy is investigating.

So, in summing up, I would say that the attempt to discredit Minister of Defense K. Morozov is continuing, and its political thrust is obvious—almost all of those who signed the declaration of the 155 signed the declaration of 242 on abolishing the prohibition on the activity of the CPU—CPSU [Communist Party of Ukraine—Communist Party of the Soviet Union]. Let each draw his own conclusions.

Cabinet of Ministers Decree Raises Minimum Service Wage

93UM0455B Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER
in Ukrainian 25 Feb 93 p 9

[Text of decree]

[Text]

Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree of 18 Feb 93 No. 121 on Pay Increases for Servicemen

In connection with the raising of the size of the minimum wages to 4,600 Ukrainian karbovantsi per month as of 1 Jan 93 and taking into account the limitations on increases in funds for wages at state enterprises, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine DECREES:

1. The salaries for individuals in the officer corps, warrant officers, and extended-duty servicemen and servicewomen are increased in the amounts corresponding to Supplement No. 2 of the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 25 Jan 93 No. 45, while the pay for conscript servicemen, cadets at higher military educational institutions, students at military schools and schools with intensified military physical training, students at military music schools and military units are increased by two times.

The salaries of servicemen in the bodies of the Security Service and the Directorate of State Defense established by decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 21 Jan 93 Nos. 36 and 37 are not subject to recomputation on the stipulated terms.

2. The force of the decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 21 Jan 93 No. 35 and of 27 Jan 93 No. 57 apropos of the procedure for establishing the salaries of supervisory personnel and specialists of the central apparatus of the ministries and agencies is extended to the servicemen of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense, the State Committee for Issues of Defending the State Border of Ukraine, the Chief Directorate of the Commander of the National Guard and the central administrative bodies of other military formations.

3. Servicemen (aside from conscript servicemen) are paid for military ranks in accordance with the Supplement.

4. The Ministry of Defense, the State Committee for Issues of the Defense of the State Border of Ukraine, the Chief Directorate of the Commander of the National Guard and the administrative bodies of other military formations will establish a procedure for the payment of supplements for certain service conditions, skills remuneration and other additional types of monetary payments of an incentive nature.

5. This decree takes effect as of 1 Jan 93.

[Signed] Prime Minister of Ukraine L. Kuchma
Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine A. Lobov

Supplement to the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 18 Feb 93 No. 121

**Salaries for Servicemen (Aside From Conscript Servicemen)
With Military Ranks**

Military rank	Salary, karbovantsi/month
Junior sergeant, petty officer 2nd class	1,500
Sergeant, petty officer 1st class	2,000
Senior sergeant, chief petty officer	2,500
Ranking NCO, master chief petty officer	3,000
Warrant officer	3,500
Senior warrant officer	4,000
Junior lieutenant	5,000
Lieutenant	5,500
Senior lieutenant	6,000
Captain, captain-lieutenant	6,500
Major, captain 3rd rank	7,000
Lieutenant-colonel, captain 2nd rank	8,000
Colonel, captain 1st rank	9,000
Major-general, rear-admiral	10,000
Lieutenant-general, vice-admiral	11,000
Colonel-general, admiral	12,000
General of the Army of Ukraine	14,000

[Signed] Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
A. Lobov

Peoples Deputy Izmalkov Reply to Omelchenko
93UM0455B Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER
in Ukrainian 27 Feb 93 p 5

[Article by Valeriy Izmalkov, People's Deputy of Ukraine and head of a subcommission of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine Commission on Issues of Defense and State Security, under the rubric "Returning to Published Materials": "Must One Always Believe the Words of H. Omelchenko?"]

[Text] The newspaper URYADOVYY KURYER published an interview with the head of the Officers' Union of Ukraine [SOU], H. Omelchenko, "There Are Declarations. What Will the Resolutions Be?" on January 30. The feature discussed in particular the stance of People's Deputy Colonel V. Izmalkov on some issues of the organizational development of the armed forces of Ukraine.

The editors have received a reply to that material from V. Izmalkov. We offer it here to the readers.

Any person who has even the slightest interest in the news has certainly already noticed this figure. He flashes around—on the radio during the day, on television at night, in newspaper after newspaper. He is the chief accuser, the chief and sole warrior, all-knowing and all-seeing, the head of the Officers' Union of Ukraine, H. Omelchenko.

H. Omelchenko, without discovering other instances of pressure on the minister of defense on the part of deputies, offers as pressure the 1,621 inquiries to the minister, including 55 of mine.

All of the letters of citizens that come addressed to the Supreme Soviet with the request to transfer their children or relatives from outside Ukraine to serve in the Fatherland are considered by me as the head of the Subcommission on Issues of the Social Protection of Servicemen. They are all then sent to the Ministry of Defense. It would be strange if I were to address them, say, to the Minister of Agriculture.

Here I would like to address my (and not just my) voters who are worried about the transfer of their children or relatives to Ukraine: your ordinary request can be turned, when desired by figures of Omelchenko's type, into a stone—the weapon of the proletariat.

Omelchenko decided he wanted to find even the slightest compromising information on me, and started ringing the phones of the personnel departments in the unit where I used to work: had I stolen, did I drink too much, did I take the oath, did I myself register, how did I breathe therein and what did I think? The readiness of the agency of General Ihnatenko (Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense [MoD] of Ukraine) to carry out all of the whims of the head of the SOU, while I was

refused a request to familiarize myself with the minutes of the sessions of the Higher Certification Commission of the MoD, is surprising.

Omelchenko, finding no other compromising information, dragged out a story of my being awarded the rank of colonel to which I have no relation whatsoever. It would be best if Omelchenko related upon what merits he himself was awarded the rank of colonel eight months after being awarded the last one of lieutenant-colonel.

And something about the SOU. I consider the SOU to be an impostor organization to which the officers have not delegated their rights. An absolute majority of officers moreover repudiate the policies of the SOU. The tiresome and hysterical behavior of the leaders of the SOU is forcing officers to try to find alternative organizations able to reflect their interests in a suitable manner. That process is provoking confrontation in the officer environment that will lead to no good. There are many today who want to make me the chief culprit in that schism.

Ukraine has been bequeathed military formations in which the larger portion of the officer corps are Russians. The predominant portion of them have taken the oath of loyalty to Ukraine, they have sworn to defend Ukrainian land and the people of Ukraine. And now they are trying to look into their soul—and what is there?

I would like to quote in closing words from the book "Rule of the Mob" (from the history of the Great French Revolution), Kiev, 1991: "Madmen, epileptics, fools and hallucinators have great power over the mob. They are isolated during ordinary times, but in the days of great troubles the mob makes them its leaders."

Aerospace Deputy Chief Petriv on Limited Offensive Doctrine

93UM0456 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 4 Mar 93 p 2

[Interview with First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Forces of Ukraine Major-General of Aviation Lyubomyr Stepanovych Petriv by journalist Kostyantyn Matushchak under the rubric "Military Affairs": "Fabrication and Reality—Surrounding the Question of the Expediency of Combining Two Branches of the Troops Into a Unified Branch of the Armed Forces of Ukraine as Decreed by the Presidential Edict"]

[Text] Major-General of Aviation L.S. Petriv was born in the Lviv area. He grew up in a working family. He successfully completed the Chernihiv Higher Aviation School in 1967. He has held command-staff posts in the Belarus Military District in recent years. He has been in the armed forces of Ukraine for six months. He is the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Forces of Ukraine.

Journalist Kostyantyn Matushchak interviewed Major-General of Aviation L. Petriv in order to get the thoughts of the professional military on the score of the issue advanced in the title.

[K. Matushchak] Lyubomyr Stepanovych, first of all let me congratulate you on your return to Ukraine, and wish you all the best and good health.

[L.S. Petriv] I sincerely thank you. Life has taken shape such that I have not been able to serve in my native land since completing school. My long-time dream was fulfilled only after the proclamation of the independence of Ukraine. I returned so as to take direct part in the development of our armed forces.

This issue naturally requires the maximum effort, professional knowledge and selflessness of all those who are involved in its implementation. Tendentiousness, prejudice and excessive emotions will only be regretted.

I feel that such factors as the lack of a military doctrine for the present day and attempts by destructive forces to drag Ukraine into military alliances and discredit the reputation of the leadership bodies of the Ministry of Defense, including the minister, are a hindrance.

A whole series of unhealthy trends has appeared, in my opinion, from the beginning of the formation of the armed forces. The basis for this was the distortion, as early as in the former USSR, of the concept of the so-called defensive military doctrine. It is not suitable for us at all. We should rely on world experience in the organizational development of both defensive and offensive military doctrines. And, finally, create a unified doctrine. Only thus will we be able to avert wars, repel aggression and defend the state. The balanced development of all branches of the armed forces and their arms and hardware with a regard for possible threats to the national interests of Ukraine, in other words, is required.

[K. Matushchak] Pardon me, general, but a tendency toward giving preference to the development of defensive means to protect against aggression is current here and there among the troops.

[L.S. Petriv] Yes, unfortunately the command of the Air-Defense Troops (PVO), one might say, has that tendency. It is conducting purposeful activity to back up the decisive role of its branch of the service in resolving the tasks of state defense for just that purpose. I am confident that this is an erroneous tendency, and it is regrettable that some deputies of parliament have been defending this so-called "umbrella over Ukraine," which will somehow collapse. Some, through incompetence on issues of military organizational development, are trying to diminish the role of the other branches of the armed forces.

But let us look at history, at least for a moment. Who can cite examples where this or that aggressor was repelled using only defensive means? If an aggressor, on the contrary, is convinced that only defensive means will be employed against him and that the retaliatory blow will scarcely be damaging, he will act even more with impunity. The experience of the local military conflicts and wars that have occurred over the course of this century are testimony to that.

Some specialists, in standing up for defensive types of arms, rely on the fact that these weapons, they say, are less expensive than offensive ones. In order to prove this, one must think about just what weapons are being considered. I am convinced that the best cannot always be the cheapest. One must also not forget the main thing—the effectiveness of this or that weapon. A conventional shell, for instance, is cheaper than a guided one. But the effectiveness of the latter is much higher.

The abilities of any armed forces do not consist only in the skillful waging of defensive operations. A no less important task is to inflict retaliatory blows in operational depth, as well as against targets in the military-industrial complex. If an enemy realizes that, he will scarcely decide to launch any aggression. And the Air Forces, with bomber, fighter/bomber, fighter and assault aviation, can inflict a retaliatory blow first and foremost.

The Air Forces of Ukraine involuntarily take on the role of the restraining factor to possible aggression when tactical nuclear weapons are ruled out. But there is no need to diminish the significance of the other branches of the service at the same time.

The Air Forces command has with justification considered it not to be advisable to interfere in the debate, figuring that common sense will prevail, that the experience of military organizational development in other countries of the world will be useful.

[K. Matushchak] Lyubomyr Stepanovych, KIYEVSKI VEDOMOSTY recently published a letter saying, "Sixteen military pilots were a hair's breadth from death for two hours. Because two commanders were finding out which of them was the senior." What would you say about that feature?

[L.S. Petriv] The material was tendentious and not objective. It is not known what service its author was trying to provide to whom. A little about the essence of the matter.

Members of the parliamentary commission of Ukraine on issues of defense and state security headed by deputy M. Lemeshyy gathered on January 29 at the PVO command post in order to hold discussions on the expediency of combining the Air Forces and the PVO into a unified branch of the armed forces. Their commanders, Lieutenant-General Valeriy Vasylyev and Lieutenant-General Mykhaylo Lopatin, were also present.

A brief exercise in the presence of these individuals was also conducted with the aim of verifying the fighting ability of these branches of the service. All, and especially the commander of the PVO, had been informed of this in advance, on January 27.

A few dozen control targets without identifying marks were sent up into Ukrainian airspace in the course of the exercise. Only the PVO radar tracking of the airspace was brought to combat readiness. The exercise was

conducted under the effective control of the PVO command. The PVO personnel discovered a portion of the control targets. None of the participants in the exercise were threatening anyone. Everything went as it should. So the attempt by journalist A. Smetanin to convince the readers that the pilots "were a hair's breadth from death" is a fabrication.

I would add this as well. The personnel of the Air Forces and the corresponding bodies for air traffic control over the territory of Ukraine were given clear-cut tasks that guaranteed security for other aircraft, including civil aviation, overall.

[K. Matushchak] And another question. Certain military are trying to prove that the commander of the Air Forces did not have the right to send flight crews up.

[L.S. Petriv] Lieutenant-General of Aviation Valeriy Vasylyev was given that right by the appropriate orders of the Minister of Defense. And he was entirely justified in utilizing that right for the purpose of verifying the combat proficiency of the aviation subunits.

As for the security of the aircraft crews against PVO fire, it was guaranteed by existing orders and instructions for the operational procedures of aviation subunits, as well as the personal presence of the Air Forces commander at the PVO command post. The more so as the PVO assets, as had been agreed, were operating only in the mode of detection of the control targets. The Air Forces command had no intention of diminishing the role and significance of the PVO in defending the state. The Air Forces had the aim of refuting the prevailing arguments that only by giving priority to the development of PVO assets could the protection of our state be fully ensured. It can be achieved only thanks to the well-coordinated operations of all the branches of the armed forces. Some shortcomings in the system of PVO troops were ascertained at the same time.

The creation of a unified branch of the Air Forces—troops for the protection of the airspace—is entirely reasonable for our state with its peaceable policies.

Judge for yourself—the skies of Ukraine at a time of aggression are a unified environment for the combat application of such branches of the service as the Air Forces, the PVO troops, the military-district PVO, ground-forces aviation, naval aviation and the missile troops. Each of those branches and arms of the service has its own commanders, command posts and command-and-control systems, which make their own decisions when combat operations are necessary. All of this is not hindered by the centralized, efficient use of the combat potential of both the Air Forces and the PVO and missile troops.

Understanding these truths, both commanders did not object—and on the contrary confirmed—the necessity of creating this branch of the armed forces. The only problem, in their opinion, was the time frame for their unification, as well as the question of who would have

the dominant role in that process. That would explain the appearance of a features in a number of newspapers whose chief aim is to block the corresponding edict from the president of Ukraine.

The actions of the parliament of Ukraine aimed at abrogating the presidential edict, which could markedly limit the possibility of the development of the armed forces, are also regrettable.

Nuclear Status Said Subject to Nation's Survival Needs

93UM0464A Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Ukrainian
10 Mar 93 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Mykola Horenko, correspondent: "START-1: A Right Rather Than an Obligation: Should Ukraine Be a Nuclear Power or Not?"]

[Text] This question can certainly be called the question of the year, the decade, or even the question of our century. Indeed, who nowadays is not interested in this problem and concerned about it? It is of interest to the rich because the nuclear status of any state affects its international authority and recognition. It concerns all of us because nuclear capability—particularly that of Ukraine—is a great responsibility for our state vis-a-vis the world community for safety and for preventing nuclear accidents or catastrophes....

Therefore, the meeting of Ukrainian people's deputies participating in the START-1 program, attended by a broad-based group of Ukrainian and foreign journalists, underscored once again the global scale, scope, and far-ranging nature of the topic as to whether Ukraine should have nuclear or non-nuclear status....

In essence, this was a consultative conference of the people's deputies, rather than a press conference. Therefore, it was strictly businesslike in nature. A report was delivered containing the principal conclusions drawn from an analysis of the legal aspects of Ukraine's ratifying the START program and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This report focused on the feasibility of our joining in the appropriate international treaties and ensuring Ukraine's national interests, along with guaranteeing its security on an equal-rights basis as a participant in international relations.

The rapporteur—a scholar from the Institute of International Relations—remarked, first of all, that the international system by its very nature is such that each state, each nation-state participating in this system is concerned for its own security and is itself responsible for the reliability of that security. The free and fully independent sovereign state of Ukraine is on firm legal grounds with regard to this problem. According to the international and national laws now in effect, Ukraine—as a newly created state—at the present time has no obligations with respect to international treaties. And it

should reach a political decision on this matter, with complete freedom and without heeding any demands from other states.

This overall conclusion stems from an objective assessment of the legal situation in which Ukraine finds itself in connection with ratifying the START-1 Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The scholarly expert pointed out that the characteristics of this situation could be broken down into the following three elements: **the nature of Ukraine's legal relations with other states; legal succession; and Ukraine's sovereign right to security, as well as the need to implement it.**

In looking at the nature of Ukraine's legal relations with other states relative to nuclear weapons, he indicated that—at the moment when Ukraine was created as a sovereign, independent state—there were considerable supplies of nuclear weapons on its territory. Does it flow from that fact—the expert asked—that Ukraine should eliminate these weapons? Do other states—including nuclear states—have the right to demand that Ukraine abandon nuclear weapons? The law now in effect provides a negative answer to this question. Ukraine has no such obligations. Nor do the other states which are participants in the international system have any such rights. As a sovereign state and a party to international law, Ukraine is directly subordinate to the valid norms of international law. The universal international law now in effect contains no normative act prohibiting states from having nuclear weapons, nor does it mandate their elimination. That is to say, as of the present, there is no juridical document which would obligate a state to rid itself of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, states are not prohibited from doing so, if that is what they desire.

Thus, questions relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, of reducing their arsenals, or of completely destroying them are regulated not by international law, but rather on the basis of international agreements among the nuclear powers. Examples of the foregoing are START and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Ukraine has no such treaties and, therefore, has no obligations in this field. We would have them from the moment that we sign such treaties.

Does the Declaration of Ukrainian State Sovereignty—wherein Ukraine's non-nuclear status was formulated—entail any legal consequences for our state? Do other states have the right to demand that Ukraine eliminate nuclear weapons in accordance with the above-mentioned declaration of a non-nuclear status? No. The Declaration—which has great overall political importance—is not a juridical fact in international relations. Section 9 of the Declaration is declarative in its nature and asserts an ultimate goal....

Hence, the attempts by some foreign states and certain officials to make demands on Ukraine and who tailor

their international principles and legalistic justification to this are juridically invalid. Ukraine remains legally free to choose its own policy with regard to nuclear weapons.

In analyzing legal succession, the expert noted that nuclear weapons had been left in Ukraine by the army of the former Soviet Union without any violations of the norms of international law. They are the exclusive property of Ukraine. All the participants in the international system have to recognize this fact and respect it as reliable.

Ukraine's legal succession to these nuclear weapons stems from the treaty between the nuclear powers dated 1 July 1958, as well as from treaties and agreements dating from 1978 and 1983. **"The Domain of Ukraine stands on firm legal grounds with regard to its possession of nuclear weapons."** Such was the conclusion reached by the expert, who buttressed it by detailed legal documentation.

"Ukraine can abandon its inherited rights to be a nuclear power. But the exercise of such a negation is a right of Ukraine, rather than its obligation." Such was the weighty conclusion arrived at by the expert working group of scholars. **Ukraine has the right to join in the START-1 Treaty, which included the former USSR. But joining it is a right of Ukraine, rather than its obligation."**

Thus, discussion nowadays can deal with Ukraine's nuclear disarmament on a parity-type basis with the other nuclear powers, rather than the absolute elimination of nuclear weapons by Ukraine as an obligation to the international community. But the latter is precisely the way that certain Western countries yearn to formulate Ukraine's nuclear policy. Well now, the conclusions drawn by the working group, the legal grounds for the policy of disarmament and reducing the arsenal of nuclear weapons comprise a weighty contribution to the strategy and tactics with regard to this question on the eve of putting START-1 up for ratification by the Ukrainian Supreme Council.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Kitovani Issues Order on Spring Call-Up

*AU1103120393 Tbilisi SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA
in Georgian 3 Mar 93 p 1*

[**"Order of the Republic of Georgia Minister of Defense on the Call-Up of Conscripts to the Republic of Georgia Armed Forces"** issued in Tbilisi on 26 February]

[Text] In accordance with the Republic of Georgia Law on Universal Military Service and the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of 19 February 1993, with the aim of holding the spring call-up of conscripts in an organized manner,

I order:

1. As of 15 March 1993, Republic of Georgia rayon and city military commissariats are to implement the training and induction of conscripts in military units of the Republic of Georgia Armed Forces.

2. Older conscripts are to be called up first to perform universal military service.

3. All conscripts aged between 18 and 25 are obliged to report to the corresponding military commissariats according to their place of residence as stated in the order of the military commissar and on the dates specified in special call-up papers.

4. Military commissariats are to adopt strict measures in accordance with the Republic of Georgia Criminal Code in order to punish those conscripts who evade reporting to the military commissariats. They are to submit materials on evasion of military service within five days to the local law enforcement bodies so that the necessary measures may be adopted.

5. The commanders of military combined units and units of the Republic of Georgia Armed Forces are to prepare the military units and training centers for the reception and allocation of conscripts and so that they can conduct their combat training in an organized manner.

6. New conscripts in the regular Army are categorically prohibited from being sent on a tour of duty to carry out special military instructions unless they have completed a six-month training program.

7. The Republic of Georgia Conscription Board is to control more stringently the work of the rayon and city conscription boards particularly with regard to the medical checks of conscripts and the protection of the law.

8. Strict measures are to be adopted with regard to those servicemen who arbitrarily leave their military units. The commanders of military units are to submit research and investigation materials within five days to the Military Procurator's Office so that measures may be adopted in accordance with the Criminal Code.

9. It is categorically forbidden to receive and assign conscripts to military units unless their call-up papers have been officially processed by the local and republican military commissariat.

10. This order is to be conveyed to the personnel of the Republic of Georgia Armed Forces.

[Signed] T. Kitovani, deputy prime minister of the Republic of Georgia, minister of defense.

Tbilisi, 26 February 1993.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Kazakh Defense Spending Figures Published, Approved

*PM1003141993 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Mar 93 p 1*

[Anatoliy Petrov report: "Kazakhstan Defense Spending Approved"]

[Text] Alma-ata—The Republic of Kazakhstan Law "On the 1993 Republic Budget" has been published. Defense spending of 69,326,367,000 rubles [R] has been approved.

The General Purpose Armed Forces have been given R41,520,648,000, the CIS Strategic Forces R25,523,427,000. R423,587,000 have been set aside for the upkeep of the Baykonur space center, R355,431,000 for the Civil Defense Staff, and R1,503,274,000 for the Republican Guard.

ARMS TRADE

Spetsvneshtekhnika Chief on Arms Exports

934E0375A Moscow TRUD in Russian 30 Mar 93
Evening Edition p 2

[Interview with V. Braylovskiy, president of the State Foreign Economic Company for Weapons and Materiel Exports and Imports "Spetsvneshtekhnika," by Dmitriy Grafov; place and date not given: "One Must Sell Guns in Order To Eat Butter"]

[Text] When they discuss trading in weapons, the talk inevitably turns to the moral and ethical aspect of the endeavor. Of course, it is better to sell baby strollers and sewing machines. However, since there is need for weapons, it must and shall be met. If they do not buy from us they will buy from others. If we withdraw from the previously developed markets, to which we are still holding on, they will certainly be taken over by foreign competitors. After all, the weapons trade generates huge profits. The interest of, say, the Americans in our conversion is far from selfless.

We will discuss precisely the export of weapons with V. Braylovskiy, president of the State Foreign Economic Company [GVK] for Weapons and Materiel Exports and Imports "Spetsvneshtekhnika."

[Braylovskiy] Of course, specific information about implemented and planned weapons transactions is kept secret. I may only give a general outline of the picture. We deliver some of the most up-to-date fighter planes, the MiG-29's and the SU-27's, to the Asia-Pacific Region through intermediaries. Germany (which inherited several copies from the GDR) is also showing interest in this plane. Iran has purchased diesel submarines. We may possibly help Iran to organize the production of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.

A few South American countries are interested in all types of weapons: from aviation and vessels to tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. We sell the tanks T-80U, T-72S, and BMP-3, and the land-based air defense missile systems Tunguska, Tor, Gang, and S-300U. These are the weapons of the last generation. Thus, the T-72S tank, which fires guided missiles through the barrel of the main gun, has no analogs in the world in its class. In general, in building tanks we have just one competitor—Germany.

Incidentally, in February these armaments were shown at an international exhibition in Abu Dhabi, and will be shown at the "IDEF-1993" international exhibition in Turkey, with the GVK "Spetsvneshtekhnika" taking a most active part in the organization of the exhibition.

[Grafov] How acute is the struggle against competitors? To what degree do relations between states influence it?

[Braylovskiy] I will give you a recent example. Two small African states had a quarrel. Within a short period of

time, their relations became aggravated to such a degree that there was the smell of gunpowder in the air. One of these states approached us with a request to sell tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. When all the documents were signed, Americans learned about it and began to offer their combat materiel—free of charge, to boot. However, this was offered in exchange for the right to develop a diamond deposit which was discovered in that country recently. Our African partners (we should give them their due) displayed firmness and prudence. The transaction was unprecedented. The materiel proceeded to combat positions right off our transport planes.

Naturally, the weapons trade is strictly regulated by state-to-state agreements. We continuously coordinate our actions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Industry, and other departments. Sensitive situations do develop.

For example, Pakistan is showing interest in our combat materiel. It is an advantageous and solvent customer, and we are happy about this. However, Pakistan has unsettled relations with India, with which we have traditionally cooperated in the military area for many years. What is to be done in this case?

We try to "refresh" our relations. Commercial contacts with the former probable enemy facilitate this to a certain degree.

At the same time, we count on India appreciating our position: It is better for us to sell weapons to Pakistan than for the United States to deliver weapons there. After all, deliveries bind producers to customers: materiel requires repairs, spare parts, and ammunition, and crews require training.

It is necessary to find a way out of each situation of this kind and to make sure that it is interpreted correctly. Other versions of cooperation are also possible—the joint development of new weapons or the updating of existing models upon orders from partners, the organization of the manufacturing of Russian weapons abroad.

[Grafov] Throughout the world, weapons sales generate tremendous profits for producers. Until recently, our state settled with enterprises at symbolic prices, naturally, in rubles. The forced conversion and cutbacks in domestic orders have now driven most defense enterprises to the brink of bankruptcy. Trade for foreign exchange is their only hope. However, weapons producers complain that, once again, trade goes on without their participation.

[Braylovskiy] Indeed, all foreign exchange generated by arms sales used to go to the treasury. All specialized foreign trade organizations which ensured the delivery and operation of combat materiel were financed from the state budget. They now act as commercial intermediaries.

Many of our defense enterprises believed that if the path to the foreign market was open to them they would strike

it rich overnight. This is a misconception. Let us assume that there is a customer who is prepared to buy a submarine. However, he is not paying for scrap metal. He needs the full scope of servicing. He asks: Who will train the crew, service and repair the submarine, deliver spare parts and ammunition? Who will I deal with—one organization or 10 of them?

This is why we undertake to provide the entire set of services. We engage in checking out the foreign client, carrying out all foreign exchange and financial operations, providing insurance, and transporting the freight.

[Grafov] However, would you not agree that all monopolies are harmful, especially in trade?

[Braylovskiy] Perhaps, monopolies restrict competition. However, in our case survival is at issue rather than windfall profits. A plant declares: We want to sell our tanks at \$500,000 a copy. We look for a customer, but we explain to them politely: Tanks of this class cost no less than \$1 million. However, no matter how much we haggle, the customer is not in a position to shell out more than \$900,000 per copy, but is ready to purchase the materiel on a long-term basis. We consult the producer and, if he is agreeable, effect a transaction. The main point is not to allow dumping to occur. If you once sell your labor for 10 kopeks, there is no way for you to prove later that it is worth a ruble.

It also happens the other way around: An enterprise wants \$40 million for its fighter plane. Understandably, they have respect for their own work and professional pride. Still, we ask them: Why \$40 million?

"How much do Eagles cost? And how is our fighter worse than the American one?"

We explain to them: There is just no way for your product to cost the same. Their "pie" has a different "filling" though yours may, perhaps, win a "taste test..."

[Grafov] Now that we are on the topic of prices, it would be interesting to know what we sell our materiel for.

[Braylovskiy] The price for each contract is determined by a multitude of factors: combat characteristics, as compared to foreign analogs, batch volume, delivery and payment deadlines and conditions, and customer solvency. This is why it does not make sense to give specific numbers for the signed contracts, on the one hand. On the other hand, if I say that a batch of MiG-29's was sold yesterday at \$26 million apiece, a customer will come tomorrow, show me your newspaper, and refuse to buy them at \$28 million.

[Grafov] One gets the impression that our weapons are competitive only because of their low prices. Does this also amount to dumping, in a certain sense?

[Braylovskiy] No, this is not dumping. First, market trends do not make it possible to charge an arm and a leg. Second, our materiel is objectively cheaper. A foreigner told me: Your tank is worse than the American one. "I

rode the Abrams. It is more comfortable, cleaner, more convenient, and has more light." Indeed, our planes and tanks do not have on-board coffee makers. Our domestic designers proceeded from concepts of a different war. The crew will make it out of our tank alive, even if dirty! This is better than to die wearing white shirts. Now that the conversation has turned to dumping, our former Warsaw Pact allies are literally selling our weapons dirt cheap. Ukraine does not particularly haggle either as it sells off armored vehicles from the units remaining in its territory.

[Grafov] The Soviet Union has fallen apart. Not only armies and military districts have remained in the territories of other republics, but, perhaps, also many defense enterprises. Interethnic conflicts are bringing about still new armed clashes. Will they be able to establish the production of weapons and combat materiel beyond the borders of Russia?

[Braylovskiy] The greatest number of enterprises with the most varied specializations remain in Ukraine, and two aviation plants in Tashkent and Tbilisi. However, not a single republic is in a position to finalize the production of any weapons without Russia. The division of labor was made absolute. However, it is interesting that none of our neighbors is even contemplating conversion. Quite the contrary, requests to transfer documentation are sent to Russia from these enterprises.

For example, they want to manufacture ammunition... Of course, we are happy about more businesslike proposals. One "independent" plant, producing engines for helicopters, understood (at long last!) that only Russia may install these engines in its helicopters. The experience of China indicates how difficult it is to establish the production of even simple firearms. After all, that country, with its tremendous potential, having superficially copied our Kalashnikov, has still been unable to match all parameters and characteristics of the original.

The republics, which are involved in interethnic conflicts and need weapons, very frequently approach Russian plants. However, the issues of weapons sales fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the government. No weapons may leave the producer plant without being sanctioned by the minister of defense of Russia.

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Do We Need a Military Doctrine and Can We Create It Now?

93UM0434A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Dec 92 p 4

[Article by Daniil Proektor: "Do We Need a Military Doctrine and Can We Create It Now?"]

[Text] The open debate on military doctrine has been going on for more than a year now. It seems everything

has been said. But I would like to add something under the impression of new events.

In general, there has not been a shortage of debates in Russia about military doctrine. The first debate occurred 80 years ago. The highly scientific people who liked to argue became so confused in the abstraction that Nikolay II, summing up the result, gave a quite clear definition of the subject: "Military doctrine involves executing that which I order you."

The revolution reopened the floodgates. Professors of the old military academy entered into new debates about doctrine. Their definitions are instructive reading. "Military doctrine is a viewpoint under which military history is understood" (A. Svechin). "Doctrine is the prophetic voice of a military genius" (I. Vatsetis). "Doctrine is the entire people's view of war" (A. Neznamov). And so on, in the same spirit of abstractions and scholasticism. "Intellectual anarchy reigns in the area of military thinking in Russia," summarized Professor Svechin.

But there was no room for difference of opinion in the rigidly centralized state that took shape. The next debate "about a unified military doctrine" put an end to the educated debates in the 1920's: "The first and most important element in the future military doctrine of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army must be the idea of the inevitability of fighting our class enemy." Abstractions were supplanted by ideologization and then, as the dictatorship strengthened, by dogmatism.

Since that time we have established a division of military doctrine into two parts: the main part is sociopolitical; the other is military-technical, subordinate to the first. These parts divided up the unified doctrine, as if transferring to the army part of the political functions of the state. Since then and for a long time, doctrine has been excessively permeated with ideology. The best Russian military minds objected all they could and defended a creative and special military beginning in the doctrine. "It frightens me directly to implant 'doctrine' in such a living matter as war... This is an attempt to bind a living art with theoretical conventions and kill the heart in it," wrote A. Zayonchkovskiy, a well-known military theorist.

Trotsky, of course, spoiled everything, supporting the "freedom of creative activity" and condemning the "yearning for stable patterns." It was clear that this was Trotskyism and should have been rejected, which it was. "Communism will triumph through the Soviets... The military ideology of the Red Army and its military world outlook will also be its military doctrine," some student activist at a military academy stated in the press. Now everything had become clear.

Decades passed. The country and the army were changing. But attempts to develop and formulate a military doctrine were expressed only in general declarations and desires. The political side came down to

presenting resolutions of the recent congresses and quoting the classics and speeches of leaders of a given period.

"The army is outside of politics," the minister of defense stated at the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies, alluding to the recently passed Law on Defense. And this, in my view, demonstrates fairly convincingly the inadvisability of our traditional division of military doctrine into two parts: the "political aspect," the existence of which was justified by the over-politicized nature of the defense consciousness, is losing its relevance today.

I would like to call attention to the fact that in the 20th century the vast majority of doctrines, or military plans that we arbitrarily called doctrines, did not correspond to the real situations and failed as soon as they were tested by war. Rapidly changing life, as a rule, outpaced the doctrines being developed slowly and in deep secrecy. And when they came into the world, it turned out that they were a "preparation for the past war." General De Gaulle wrote: "...military leaders have become enfeebled in their positions, remaining adherents to outdated views that once brought them glory."

I doubt that the time has come today to create another new doctrine. Today when everything in our country is in flux, Russian statehood has not become fully established, borders are unclear, the constitution is changing, when the army is just being created, military reform has only begun, when the economy is unstable and in a crisis, a global regrouping of the world centers of power is unfolding, and there are arguments about the main foreign policy priorities.

It is possible that policy methods of military force will still be supplanted by the newest economy, technology, information science, and trade. And there are new threats associated with the economic and spiritual collapse of our society, the savagery of ethnic conflicts, general overpopulation, "resettlement of peoples," and new outbursts of chauvinism in Europe.

If someone says that all this is of no special importance for military thinking and doctrines, he is deeply mistaken. We should not rush. We ceremoniously, at the highest level, announced on 29 May 1987 the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Member-States. And what was left of it a couple of years later? Yes, nothing. I think we should not only wait with the formulation of a doctrine, but also re-examine the traditional inflexibility, directive nature, and rigidity of the approach to it as to some "algorithm." And we should replace it with something flexible, dynamic, and able to react closely to rapid changes in the world. It seems the time has passed for the old understanding of doctrines that emerged with the frozen static fronts of World War I. The efficacy of modern military concepts is inseparably linked to the stability of the state and realization of human rights. Our tragedy of 1941 was determined not by the quality of the doctrine but, above all, by the upheavals of the society in

the 1930's and the "dispossession of the peasants" of the country. So, what is to be done? After all, the country's national interests require immediate development of unified principles in the area of defense and security.

The minister of defense justly said at the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies: "In the 75 years of Soviet power, there was no doctrine as such, as a document, which we are now still trying to create and approve in the Supreme Soviet. All doctrinal guidelines before were based on reports at the plenums and congresses." But do we need this single document, a gigantic structure under whose roof all the numerous elements of national security would be placed and which ultimately would turn out to be just a listing of general intentions?

Would it not be simpler to determine such a necessary unity of views based on three interrelated elements. First, the military policy, determined by the president, Supreme Soviet, government, and Security Council based on the Constitution and the Law on Defense and indicating the main principles of military-political tasks, military organizational development and strategy, budget, and so forth. Second, defense organizational development, subordinate to military policy and encompassing the vast spheres of activity of the military industrial complex, forming the armed forces, ensuring their fighting efficiency, education, reform, and conversion. The third, military strategy, the broad spheres of strategic and operational planning, leadership, and command and control of the armed forces in peacetime and war. Having rejected the rigid, all-encompassing doctrines of the old style, we could give new impetus to initiative and make our defense mechanism more flexible.

Judging by the concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, our super-task lies in joining the club of the leading democratic civilized states and, in the future, an alliance with the United States. Marshal Shaposhnikov says clearly that he is against such definitions as potential adversary or "enemy." And he continues: "We need to decisively get rid of this way of thinking and the unceasing struggle with someone, against someone."

This truly historical progress in our military-political thinking reflects a new political philosophy of forming a democratic state. But it also reflects the very difficult situation which the armed forces are in, forced simultaneously to form a new army, conduct reforms, withdraw troops from abroad, find work for them, develop a new system of education, and so forth. No army in the world is facing such a set of very complicated tasks.

It is all the more strange that, on the other hand, there are experts who are sort of abstract from realities and are calling for something opposite. For example, in that same foreign policy concept, judging by the published presentation of it, there are calls to "firmly oppose the recurrences of imperial manifestations in the policy of Washington" and its attempts "to become the sole

superpower," as well as our claims to equality with the United States. But what are we to consider imperial manifestations today? Is it not time finally to draw conclusions from our past "firm opposition" throughout the world—from Cuba to Angola and Vietnam?

Another question: Is it a defensive or offensive doctrine? We have stated many times that it is defensive. And these are not the whimsy of politicians and diplomats, but the objective requirement of the times: 1) a democratic state cannot be an aggressor; 2) there is a law of war and peace that has been tested by a century of experience: in the 20th century, he who starts a war not only loses it but plunges his people and other peoples into a terrible catastrophe; 3) the generally known condition of our country's economy rejects an offensive orientation or military policy.

Therefore, the bravado still encountered sometimes with demands to reject a concept of defense is simply incomprehensible, such as the authoritative statement published in the press from one of the conferences published in the sense that "it is time to reject such concepts as a defensive doctrine and defensive strategy" and that statements about not using nuclear weapons first "indicate a repeat of the mistakes of past years, intended for the self-advertisement of political leaders." Where and when did we make a mistake, by not having dropped atomic bombs first and not having evoked a destructive response to them?

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Possible Threats to Russian Security in the Far East

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26 Mar 93 p 7

[Article by Igor Sukhanov: "The East Is a Sensitive Matter... Is Russia Facing a Threat of Military Conflicts in the Far East?"]

[Text] Several days ago North Korea announced its potential withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The news immediately caused a tidal wave of commentaries on front pages of the world press. Time will tell whether it was a serious step or only a political move. Right now there is talk in Pyongyang that the DPRK probably will still adhere to the treaty. What will happen, however, if it does withdraw? East Asia undoubtedly will become a new epicenter of potential military conflicts.

Currently, stability and security of the situation in the Asian-Pacific Region (APR) depends on at least six countries: China, both Koreas, Russia, the United States, and Japan.

With respect to the DPRK, only one item may be added to the aforementioned: This country, in general, is an

extremely well organized semimilitary camp, which is quite capable of becoming fully military as soon as there is such an order from the North Korean leader.

South Korea, traditionally oriented towards the military and economic might of the United States and Japan, is not behind its northern neighbor in terms of its military potential. The recent large-scale American-South Korean maneuvers actually have prompted the exacerbation of the situation in the region and became one of the reasons for the DPRK's aforementioned statement.

China, which is experiencing an economic upturn, with its enormous human and military resources, and on top of that in possession of weapons of mass destruction, is becoming an increasingly mighty military power with each passing year.

The situation in Russia and the United States we probably know best of all. And, as before, Japan remains for us a little-known country in a military respect.

This country, being in the shadow of the American military "umbrella," possesses modest armed forces—defense forces, as official Tokyo constantly emphasizes. They number about 240,000-250,000. Not too much for a country with a population of 123.6 million.

Despite an all-out reduction of armed forces both around the world and in the APR; despite being close to the end of the Cold War, the Land of the Rising Sun continues to increase its military budget. In 1991, it amounted to 4.159 trillion yen [Y]; in 1992, Y4.552 trillion; and in 1993 it plans to spend Y4.640 trillion. Overall, in accordance with the so-called Eighth Five-Year Defense Plan (1991-1995), Japan is planning to allocate at least Y22.7 trillion for these purposes.

Japan's policy of increasing its military budget provokes response measures on the part of other countries. Besides, the Japanese military machine is not all that harmless. Yes, Tokyo does not have nuclear weapons and strategic forces, but they do exist on U.S. military bases located on the islands of Japan in accordance with the Japanese-American security agreement. In short, the position of Japan—a mighty world economic power and, as it turns out, far from a weak country militarily—affects a lot when it comes to ensuring security in the Asian-Pacific region.

A few days ago, a Japanese-Russian symposium "Security in Asia—a Common Task for Japan and Russia" took place in Moscow. ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI has availed itself of an opportunity to bring to the reader leading Japanese specialists' point of view on the problem of security in Asia.

Professor Masasi Nisihara, Japanese National Defense Academy:

"Over many years the USSR was perceived as a threat to Japan's security; therefore, we entered an alliance with the United States, seeing your country as an adversary. Now, in the opinion of the Japanese Government, this

threat has been considerably reduced; nevertheless, we still have certain concerns when it comes to Russia's military might. Judge for yourself: The quantity of Russia's armaments in the Pacific region is not decreasing; obsolete military equipment is regularly replaced by new issue; and besides, Russia still keeps secret true information about its real military potential in the Far East. Therefore, before we talk of some joint security actions, we must have this information. Russia must make this first goodwill step.

"As to increasing military expenditures in our country, they are to a greater extent the result of inflation, since the share of money used to pay military salaries is increasing. Expenditures on armaments procurements, on the other hand, are decreasing at the rate of approximately five percent a year. Besides, there is no possibility now of increasing the numeric strength of defense forces, since Japan currently does not have enough young people of draft age. There are no calls—at both government and public opinion level—for Japan to reorient its armed forces towards offensive tasks, and embarking on procurement or production of offensive weapons is not considered viable."

Tatsumi Okabe, professor of international policy at Tokyo University:

"Socialism's dramatic loss of its driving force is the greatest change that has taken place in the world. In East Asia, however, where communism has often merged with nationalism, which produced a powerful effect, there still are countries that adhere to this ideology. They continue to exist and develop under the banner of socialism despite its demise in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

"The cracks that have appeared in the relationship between Japan and the United States, which had played the leading role in the Asian-Pacific Region, symbolize the disintegrating unity of the ASEAN countries. And although ASEAN members have agreed to create a free trade zone in the future, today they look more like competitors rather than partners.

"Under such circumstances there is a number of potential scenarios for ensuring security in East Asia after the end of the Cold War.

"First: The United States will continue to maintain its military presence in the region and to cooperate with Japan and other allies. This will lead to a transition from the old system of means of deterrence aimed against the Soviet Union to another, designed to deter any potential regional conflicts.

"Second: The United States withdraws its armed forces from East Asia or reduces them below the minimum level necessary for effective defense and deterrence. Most observers believe that in this case Japan will fill the emerging vacuum of power, although it is possible that China will claim this role.

"By the third scenario, the vacuum of power will not be filled at all. East Asian countries will embark on an arms race, and the antagonisms that exist between them will lead to a series of military conflicts.

"From the short-term and medium-term point of view, the best scenario is probably the one based on preserving American military presence. With financial help from Japan and other countries, the United States should preserve its position as the strongest military power in the world and carry out its political role, at least in the Asian-Pacific Region.

"Russia and China undoubtedly also possess considerable potential for self-assertion. However, the domestic political situation in Russia will force it to concentrate efforts on the reorganization of its economy. At the same time, its dependence on Western aid, including that of the United States and Japan, will prevent it from using the armaments it will be able to keep.

"Lately, there has been an increased concern over the actions of China, which has acquired considerable quantities of highly sophisticated military technology (especially SU-27 fighter planes) from the former USSR, and besides, possesses nuclear technology. However, because of its technical backwardness, China is even less capable of filling the vacuum of power than Japan in the event of U.S. forces' withdrawal from the APR, and most likely will not be able to take America's place in a military respect at least until the middle of the next century.

"Despite widespread anti-American moods in the world, most countries still want the United States to remain in East Asia. It can fulfill a role in this region no other country could undertake. Besides, preserving its military presence in Asia also provides invaluable benefits for the United States, which is losing its economic superiority and now can claim only a military one."

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